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Abstract 
 
 
The main objective of this minor dissertation is to unpack the convoluted bilateral relationship 
between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Republic of South Africa. Lesotho’s extreme 
dependence on South Africa is explored in terms of geopolitical dependence, labour migration, 
the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and royalties accrued from the Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project (LHWP). The exhaustive amount of literature that explores these themes of 
Lesotho’s dependence clearly reflects the dominance of South Africa during the apartheid and 
post-apartheid eras. A factor that further complicates these analyses is that South Africa, an 
‘economic giant’ on the African continent, is dependent on the water resources of the politically 
and economically weaker, landlocked Lesotho. In consideration of South Africa’s dependence on 
Lesotho’s water, the relationship can be regarded as an interdependent relationship. The concept 
of interdependence and the theory of complex interdependence provide some theoretical basis 
from which to analyse the ‘web of interactions’ between the two countries. 
 
While apartheid South Africa was regarded as the quintessential realist actor, the post-apartheid 
government aimed to shed the skin of its predecessor’s hegemonic pursuits in southern Africa. 
Post-apartheid South Africa has faced criticism as a nation-state that has unilaterally manipulated 
Lesotho in pursuit of maintaining its national interest, reducing the values of transfers from 
dependence factors. While the relationship may be characterised as asymmetrical 
interdependence, the nature of the relationship is not entirely the same as in the post-apartheid 
era. Each factor of dependence needs to be reflected on in order to shed light on the historical 
and current contexts that shows that the likelihood of interdependence would be sustained. South 
Africa’s role should not be perceived merely in terms of power manipulation, but also in terms of 
factors of benevolence and cooperation that have changed the nature of the relationship between 
the two countries. In addition, there are factors not determined by South Africa that help to 
maintain the politically and economically fragile position of Lesotho.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1      Background and aims 
 
A recurring theme of the scholarly literature on the relationship between South Africa and 
Lesotho during the apartheid period is based on the mountainous kingdom as a ‘hostage state’, 
bullied  and  persistently  manipulated  by  the  white-minority-led  South  African  government 
(Libby, 1987: 7). Once the Kingdom of Lesotho gained its independence in 1966, the British 
relinquished itself of its administrative duties and reduced aid transfers, which  allowed the 
landlocked country’s dependence on South Africa to steadily increase. At this point, cordial 
relations between the neighbours ensued. Despite despising South Africa’s policy of apartheid, 
the ruling Basotho National Party’s (BNP) consideration of Lesotho’s bread-and-butter issues 
urged the party to forge friendly relations to sustain various transfers in the form of remittances, 
customs revenue and routine trade (Weisfelder, 2014: 112). 
 
Lesotho’s high dependence has been exhaustively explored in analyses of its bilateral relations 
with an ‘economic giant’ on the African continent, but the comparably industrially weak 
peripheral country had a resource to offer South Africa that could not be manufactured, namely 
water. The Oxbow Scheme, an inter-basin water transfer (IBT) scheme, was proposed in the 
1950s to tap Lesotho’s abundant water supplies to the increasingly drought-stricken industrial 
heartland of South Africa, Gauteng province (Abhukhater, 2013: 152). The potential IBT made 
Lesotho   diplomatically   more   significant   to   South   Africa,   signalling   an   interdependent 
relationship.  Such  a  relationship  mirrored  the  reality  of  the  twentieth  century  that  was 
increasingly acknowledged by interdependence theorists, who stressed that even powerful states 
could  no  longer  operate  as  completely  self-sufficient  or  independent  ‘black  boxes’.1   Their 
analyses  of  the  interdependence  of  countries  illustrated  a  conductively  cooperative  global 
political arena. 
 
 
 
1 
Structural realism refers to certain states as ‘black boxes’, meaning states are generally similar, purely driven by 
the pursuit of power and national interest. Internal features such as the regime type, decision-making quality or 
characteristics of leadership within a state are not of concern (Blyth, 2009: 29; Frankel, 1996: 127). A critique of the 
‘black box’ concept is that it provides an oversimplified view of the state in international relations. Keohane and 
Nye open up the concept of the ‘black box’ by not merely identifying interactions based on military security in 
tandem with national interest and the state as a  primary actor (Blyth, 2009: 29). Instead, Keohane and Nye 
acknowledge the myriad of transnational factors that form part of a web of interactions.
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Once relations soured in the 1970s, Pretoria’s ‘strangling grip’ demonstrated how South Africa’s 
hegemonic   military   and   economic   regional   assertiveness   made   uncompliant   behaviour 
particularly difficult for an enclave state (Weisfelder, 1992: 643). The apartheid South African 
government displayed traits of hostility and aggression as it relentlessly exploited its military 
might in attempts to exercise and increase its power in the southern African region. The IBT 
scheme, eventually re-planned and renamed the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), was 
impossible to implement under a conflictual relationship. The South African-government-backed 
Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) gained power in 1986, creating a cooperative environment for 
the formal signing of the 1986 Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty. Bilateral relations improved 
further with the inception of South Africa’s democratic dispensation led by the leading liberation 
movement, the African National Congress (ANC). The new South African government 
concertedly reshaped the regional identity of South Africa as a ‘benign’ dominant power (Alden 
& Soko, 2005: 370). A serious dilemma faced the new South African government: while regional 
and international euphoria around the respected pro-black government led to positive economic 
anticipations, the colonial and apartheid legacies moulded the dependence and setbacks of 
countries such as Lesotho within a neoliberal regional and global political economy. 
 
Weisfelder (2014: 109) refers to 2012 media reports that allege that South Africa treats Lesotho 
worse than it did under apartheid. This hypothesis is tested by analytically deducing whether a 
mutually beneficial relationship has replaced previous ‘hegemonic patterns’. In this dissertation, 
it is argued that characterising the South Africa-Lesotho relationship as one of unilateral 
manipulation is too simplistic and problematic. To understand the extent of Lesotho’s reliance on 
post-apartheid South Africa, the multiple layers and multi-faceted challenges Lesotho faces both 
internally and externally as one of the world’s least developed countries (LDC) have to be 
unpacked. Cyclical underdevelopment, geopolitical dependence, crippling unemployment, a 
fragile democracy and poor political will collectively contribute to and sustain the level of high 
dependence faced by Lesotho. Thus, this dissertation unpacks three themes of Lesotho’s 
dependence (the third of which also addresses South Africa’s dependence on Lesotho): labour, 
the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the LHWP. The Joint Bilateral Commission 
of Cooperation (JBCC) between Lesotho and South Africa is not considered, for the sake of 
brevity and its trajectory has been much shorter than the selected themes.
3 
Lesotho’s anomalous position as an enclave leads to the obvious assumption that such a state 
would remain dependent on its only neighbour. South Africa’s provisions for SACU, the 
Common Monetary Area (CMA), LHWP, remittances received from employment of Basotho
2 
in
South Africa, technological transfers in the form of telecommunications and infrastructural 
development, investment in the textile industry, manufacturing technology and transport are or 
have been among the many contributions that prevent Lesotho from slumping into a ‘failed 
state’. On assessment of these indicators of dependence, scholars are divided as to whether South 
Africa should be characterised as a benevolent dominant power that provides public goods to a 
region whose economic prosperity was hindered by colonial rule, or whether South Africa should 
be  characterised  as  an  exploitative  power  that  intentionally  undermines  its  neighbours’ 
economies through the service of international and national capital (Alden & Soko, 2005: 368). 
This  simplified  dichotomy should  be  carefully  analysed  as  a  more  complex  relationship  is 
revealed. 
Firstly, this dissertation explores migrant labour as a theme of dependence. The underlying factor 
here is Lesotho’s extreme reliance on remittances. The migrant labour corridor from Lesotho to 
South Africa has been a persistent reality for Basotho seeking employment and for households in 
Lesotho reliant on remittances for their livelihood. Tied into this theme is the shared community 
that  points to  the ‘porousness’ of the shared  border. With  regards to  the idea  of a shared 
community, there are cultural, social and economic ties between the neighbours, especially due 
to the large Sotho-speaking community in South Africa. 
Secondly, regional economic agreements such as the CMA and the SACU have played a vital 
financial and economic role for Lesotho. The focally explored regional economic agreement, 
SACU, generates an overwhelmingly significant proportion of revenue to the national budget. 
SACU’s post-apartheid democratic transformations or lack thereof is unpacked. 
Lastly, the LHWP is explored as a world-class IBT scheme with a dual purpose of providing 
revenue and electricity to Lesotho while transferring water to South Africa’s Gauteng province. 
2 
Only in the twentieth century has the use of the term ‘Basotho’ become ‘synonymous’ or equated with citizens of 
Lesotho,  regardless  of  the  different  ethnicities  that  are  not  necessarily  Sotho-speaking or  ‘ethnically’  Sotho 
(Weisfelder, 2004: 12–3). Generally, this dissertation does the same. ‘Basotho’ is treated as the plural for citizens of 
Lesotho, while ‘Mosotho’ is the singular form of Basotho. However, it also acknowledges that Basotho can also 
refer to the ethnic or linguistic Sotho community in South Africa.
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While   Lesotho   faces   these   extreme   disadvantageous   circumstances,   what   should   be 
acknowledged at the same time is the level of interdependence and how acute water transfers to 
Gauteng  from  the  LHWP  have  been  essential  to  the  economic  growth  of  South  Africa’s 
industrial heartland. 
 
This dissertation focuses on the trajectory of the post-apartheid era. Lesotho’s political instability 
is drawn into the LHWP section. With the inception of the ANC in 1994, as a leading group of 
the anti-apartheid liberation movement, the ANC government was regarded as a more amicable 
regime than its suppressive predecessors and openly expressed its principles of non-intervention. 
Yet, in 1998, the South African-led Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
intervention into Lesotho went against South Africa’s principle of ‘non-interference’ or ‘non- 
intervention’. South Africa’s military might was utilised to prevent a coup d’état against the 
Lesotho Congress of Democrats (LCD). On the one hand, it was argued that the intervention was 
a means to sustain political stability at the request of Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili. On the 
other hand, as political and social instability threatened the supply of water to South Africa’s 
Gauteng province, it was also argued that South Africa’s intention to intervene was primarily for 
the sake of its national interest in the LHWP. 
 
While the idea  that  South  Africa  was  acting in  its  self-interest  can  easily be applied,  this 
dissertation analyses the level of interdependence to discern the level of dependence of each and 
the role of power on these factors of dependence. This conceptual and theoretical analysis is 
informed by interdependence theory, drawing mainly upon Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s 
conceptual and theoretical work on interdependence. This dissertation shall not seek to disprove 
the more popularly considered theory of realism
3  
and its relevance to the case of Operation 
 
Boleas. Through understanding the applicable understandings of interdependence and complex 
 
 
 
3  
Although this dissertation does not engage with comprehensive elaboration realism, some basic ideas of realism 
can be laid out. One can differentiate between classical realism and structural realism, but the basis of both strands is 
based on the following: 1) A pessimistic perception of human nature; 2) The presumption that international relations 
is primarily characterised by conflict in an anarchic world and that international conflicts are solved by war; 3) The 
perception that the central values of the state are its survival and national security; 4) Undervaluing the likelihood of 
progress in international relations comparable to progress in politics at a domestic level. Even if a state commits to 
certain ideals of benevolent international relations, the anarchic world requires that states acquire a military means to 
protect their countries (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013: 66). One can then go into deeper differentiations between 
classical realism and structural realism, whereby the former is a normative approach and the latter is positivist. This 
analysis refers mainly to the concepts espoused in structural realism.
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interdependence, it shall be illustrated that the analysis of the bilateral relationship goes beyond 
the primacy of military security. The shortfalls and inconsistencies of complex interdependence 
are considered, where realism might provide more useful analytical tools. Through exploring the 
various themes of interdependence, the dissertation aims to assert that the various exchanges 
between the countries present meaningful cooperation, so that even though there are shortfalls 
and controversies, both countries have benefited much from each other. 
 
1.2      Hypothesis 
 
Lesotho’s extreme economic dependence on South Africa has persisted from the apartheid to the 
post-apartheid period. After South Africa started to receive water transfers from the LHWP, the 
bilateral relationship can be described as an asymmetrical interdependent relationship. It is, 
however, too simplistic to equate post-apartheid South Africa’s interactions with Lesotho as a 
mere  aggressor  and  manipulator  of  Lesotho’s  dependence.  Each  theme  of  both  states’ 
dependence can be examined with nuanced analyses into the highly complicated relationship and 
the factors that affect it. 
 
1.3      Methodology 
 
The dissertation is conducted through desktop research. It is a qualitative analysis, utilising 
secondary resources in the form of journal articles, books, policy briefs and newspaper articles. 
The book titled Power and Interdependence (1977) written by liberal-institutionalist theorists, 
Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, informs the conceptual and theoretical framework applied in 
this  dissertation.  A  variety  of  scholars  such  as  Khabele Matlosa,  James  Cobbe,  Richard 
Weisfelder, Scott Rosenberg and Francis K. Makoa are consulted for their extensive breadth of 
scholarly literature on Lesotho’s predicaments, which spans from the apartheid to the post- 
apartheid period. World Bank reports are consulted, specifically for the economic intricacies on 
themes of poverty, infrastructure development, private–public sector contributions and so on. 
 
These themes were specifically chosen as they are the common themes elaborated on in scholarly 
work that assesses the bilateral relationship. Despite the historical background that provides 
scope into the political interactions of Lesotho all the way back to its history as a British 
protectorate, a historical background fine-tuned to the relevant theme is introduced in each
6 
 
 
chapter, due to the fact that present considerations must be contextualised within the specified 
historical background. 
 
1.4      Challenges and limitations 
 
There is a limited amount of contemporary literature on bilateral relations between South Africa 
and  Lesotho  in  the  field  of  International  Relations  (IR).  On  the  one  hand,  assessments  of 
relations have often supported the notion of South Africa as an aggressor, instead of providing a 
more nuanced approach focused on diplomacy and relational developments that have contributed 
to  change  in  the  nature  of  the  post-apartheid  relationship.  In  addition,  scholars  commonly 
interpret the relationship through a realist lens, making it easier to adopt the traditional approach. 
In specific events and circumstances, realist motivations of South Africa are generally clear, but 
in the analysis of South Africa’s contributions to alleviate Lesotho’s predicament, alternatives to 
realism are not commonly explored in assessing the relationship. 
 
The scale of Lesotho’s reliance goes beyond this dissertation, as there are multiple themes that 
this  analysis  cannot  do  justice to.  The focus  does  explore a broad  post-apartheid  timeline. 
However, the nature of analysing each theme forces one to conduct analyses over a broad period 
as the juncture of apartheid’s demise led to considerable changes in the relationship. In addition, 
statistics can sometimes be inconsistent and can vary from source to source.
4
 
 
 
1.5      Theoretical background: The case of interdependence 
 
‘Interdependence’ is a pinnacle concept explored in this study, whereby this analysis gauges with 
the concept as a strand of liberal cooperation theory. In their book, Power and interdependence 
(1977: 728), Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jnr present three principle themes to analyse the 
constraints on the utilisation of force in exercising power, but only the first two are applied in 
this thesis. Firstly, drawing on bargaining theory, a power-orientated analysis of interdependence 
and politics utilises measurable variables to determine how factors of dependence influence 
outcomes  in  interdependent  relationships.  Secondly,  the  ‘ideal  type’  of  an  interdependent 
relationship, ‘complex interdependence’, is presented as a theory (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013: 
 
 
4 
An example is mentioned in John E. Bardill and James Cobbe’s book titled Lesotho: Dilemmas of dependence in 
southern Africa (1985: 55), which highlights the deceptiveness of statistics gathered on economic trends since 
Lesotho’s independence.
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105; Keohane & Nye, 1977: 728). Although the themes can be related to one another, they are 
also acknowledged as distinct to some degree; each theme can be presented independently of the 
remaining two (Keohane & Nye, 1977: 733). This dissertation limits the utilisation of the above- 
mentioned themes to the first two. 
 
1.5.1   Interdependence and political bargaining 
 
In the field of international relations in the 1970s, interdependence theories arose as a challenge 
to the predominant traditional approach of realism. The 1973 oil crisis was part of dramatic 
changes that took place in global politics at the time (Esakova, 2012: 22). The United States of 
America (USA) was  economically and  militarily far stronger than the  oil  producers in  the 
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries, but the USA could not 
successfully persuade the producers to decrease the prices. This scenario was evidence of how 
the USA, dependent on oil from comparably weaker countries, could not utilise its military might 
to influence oil producers. Primarily, the debate centred on questioning the autonomy of the 
traditional notion of the state and whether it predominated over social forces or non-state actors.
5
 
 
Through the rise of international interdependence, interdependence theorists break down states 
into  ‘incoherent  entities’  that  are  increasingly  prioritising  ‘low  politics’  that  span  from 
economics, to ecological issues and the distribution of welfare (Hobson, 2000: 2). To further 
differentiate with the interdependence perspective, structural realists place emphasis on the 
hierarchy of power, the interdependence perspective takes the middle ground, accepting that 
units have both shared and divergent interests, where the units can help and harm one another. 
 
Whereas ‘dependence’ simply refers to ‘a state of being determined significantly by external 
forces’, ‘interdependence’ refers to mutual dependence where relevant circumstances are 
characterised by reciprocal effects among state or non-state actors (Keohane & Nye, 1977: 8). 
The effects result from international transactions where commodities, currency, information or 
people form part of a flow across international boundaries. Transactional activity increased 
significantly from the time of World War II. 
 
 
5 
Realists contend that states are the central actors in world politics. On the other end of the spectrum, liberals and 
radical pluralists insist that the autonomy of the state is declining as the state is being outwitted by economic 
processes that signal interdependence and  non-state actors that are  mainly, yet  not  exclusively, multinational 
corporations. One particular factor argued against was the neorealist assumption of states as coherent, rational and 
autonomous actors merely concerned with the ‘high politics’ of military security (Hobson, 2000: 2).
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Interdependence is referred to in situations where the prevention of the flow of one or more 
goods  results  in  a  costly  and  constraining  impact.  Where  there  is  no  costly  impact, 
‘interconnectedness’ is referred to. In the first chapter of Power and interdependence, power and 
its   link   to   interdependence   is   emphasised,   through   the   concept   of   ‘asymmetrical 
interdependence’ (Koehane & Nye, 1987: 728). Asymmetrical interdependence clearly indicates 
that one party benefits less than the other; as opposed to mutual interdependence, asymmetrical 
interdependence can be manipulated by the less dependent actor who frequently has a significant 
political resource as a power tool (Keohane & Nye, 1977: 11). Keohane and Nye (1977: 11) 
contextually refine their reference to asymmetrical interdependence as a source of power by 
thinking in terms of power as control of resources. Asymmetries in interdependence are regarded 
as providing the most likely power sources for actors within their dealings with other actors 
(Koehane & Nye, 1987: 728). At the same time, it is acknowledged that asymmetry in one’s 
favour does not always ensure ‘similar patterns or control over outcomes’ (Keohane & Nye, 
1977: 11). The usual tool that influences outcomes is conducted through political bargaining. 
The elaboration on the links between interdependence and power aims to answer the question of 
how international politics is affected under conditions of interdependence (Crane & Amawi, 
1997: 130). 
 
 
‘Sensitivity’ and ‘vulnerability’ refer to the costs of dependence from external changes, where 
the former relates to the impact of suffering costs within a policy framework in place prior to the 
externally caused costs and the latter relates to the ability and the liability taken to change 
policies by reducing or alleviating the impact of the costs (Keohane & Nye, 1977: 13). With the 
Bretton  Woods  culminated  decision  of  a  fixed  exchange  rate  system,  where  signatories’ 
currencies were pegged to the dollar and the dollar was fixed to their gold supplies, the USA 
would be sensitive to the demand to convert dollars into gold as their gold reserves would 
deplete while signatories would be sensitive to the monetary policy of the USA. Yet, the USA 
would be less vulnerable than other signatories as it had the hegemonic capability to amend its 
monetary policy by changing the global monetary system to that of a floating exchange rate 
(Keohane & Nye, 1977: 12). Measuring vulnerability is particularly useful when discerning how 
power is exercised in ‘political structures of interdependence relationships’ (Keohane & Nye,
9 
 
 
1977: 15).
6 
Therefore, the manipulation of asymmetrical sensitivities without incorporating 
vulnerabilities likely results in failures and even non-military counterstrategies in desperation 
(Keohane & Nye, 1977: 15). 
 
With  regards  to  the  military  as  an  instrument  of  the  state,  Keohane  and  Nye’s  analysis 
emphasises how military vulnerability remains  imperative in world politics. Military power 
dominates over economic power as economic means cannot solely be effective against military 
force (Keohane & Nye, 1977: 733). Military means is not always the most effective means and, 
with the rise of ‘interdependence theory’, the cost of using military force has been regarded as 
higher (Keohane & Nye, 1977: 734). 
 
1.5.2   Principles of complex interdependence 
 
Keohane and Nye’s theory of complex interdependence is based on three main assumptions. 
 
 
The  first  assumption  regards  the  ties  of  ‘multiple  channels’  created  by  the  ‘transnational, 
interstate and transgovernmental’ interaction. Non-state actors standardised participation in 
foreign and domestic relations.
7  
Keohane and Nye originally regarded this as evidence of how 
the state is no longer the prime object in international affairs.
8 
Private banks and firms’ 
transnational activities make a state’s policy-making more susceptible to other states’ policy- 
making.  These  actors’  activities  ‘blur  the  lines’  between  domestic  and  foreign  policy,  for 
example, where global banks financial regulations simultaneously affect international–domestic 
circumstances (Keohane & Nye, 1977: 20). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
Vulnerability dependence is regarded as a more ‘relevant’ and useful analytical tool, as its conception incorporates 
a strategic dimension where coherent policy formulations have to incorporate vulnerabilities (Keohane & Nye, 
1987: 733). 
7  
Examples include private corporations, private banks and firms, multinational corporations (MNCs), and non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs). 
8  
Keohane and Nye (1977: 20) cite the example of the 1973-founded Trilateral Commission that brought together 
non-partisan citizens of ‘core-industrialised countries’ for the purpose of fostering stronger cooperation ‘with shared 
leadership responsibilities in the international system’.
10 
 
 
Secondly, an ‘absence of hierarchy among issues’ means that military security is not the premise 
of a state’s agenda. National security is argued to be multidimensional, such as incorporating 
ecological and economic security instead of merely being dominated by military security.
9
 
 
Thirdly, military security is not utilised ‘within a region’ where the case of complex 
interdependence between states exists, unless for the purpose of creating a military alliance with 
a state in another regional bloc. Force is regarded as an inappropriate means for a state to achieve 
desired ends. Where the utilisation of the military is regarded as irrelevant in resolving economic 
discrepancies between members of an alliance, complex interdependence prevails (Keohane & 
Nye, 1977: 21–2). 
 
The justification for the existence of complex interdependent scenarios does not deem realism 
null nor does it deem military security or conflict irrelevant. Yet, Keohane and Nye (1977) 
mention that, despite cases where complex interdependence exists, two qualifications pertaining 
to conflict persist: Firstly, in the event of drastic political and social change, force is likely to 
become a key policy instrument; secondly, despite complementary interests between elites, a 
state  exercising  force  to  protect  another  has  significant  political  influence  over  that  state 
(Keohane & Nye, 1977: 23). 
 
1.5.3   Theoretical limitations 
 
One could provide various limitations to complex interdependence, but this dissertation intends 
to reflect on ones more relevant to the application of the dissertation’s analysis. 
 
With the first principle of complex interdependence of ‘multiple channels’, the primacy of the 
state is questioned due to the increasing amount of non-state actors that have taken the stage as 
spheres of influence in world politics. However, in Globalisation: What’s new? What’s not? 
(And so what?) (2000: 118), Keohane and Nye acknowledge that the content of world politics 
has changed in the midst of globalisation. However, they admit that the sovereign state is likely 
to remain the predominant actor in world politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
States’ sources of power are decreasingly defined by defensive capability, but power is also determined by factors 
such as education, economic growth and technology (Keohane & Nye, 1977: 20).
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D’Anieri (2015: 82) mentions an interesting realist counter to complex interdependence’s 
descriptive world imagery as one with a wide-ranging list of actors, relationships and goals. A 
realist can acknowledge this description, but is not necessarily concerned with presenting an 
accurate description of the world. Instead, the realist is more concerned with providing the 
explanatory tools to identify endlessly existing dynamics of self-interest. A realist could claim 
that complex interdependence provides an answer to a very different set of questions, but its 
nuance loses sight of the ‘bigger picture’. 
 
Arguably, realism can be applied in more cases. Keohane and Nye (2000: 115) themselves state 
that complex interdependence is ‘far from universal’; it is trickier to apply.10 On reflection of the 
prevalence of military conflict in the 1990s, they explain that the relevance of their theory is 
more applicable to pluralist democracies and ‘advanced information-era democracies bordering 
the Atlantic and the Pacific’, as well as ‘poorer states of Latin America and increasingly Eastern- 
Central Europe’ (2000: 115). 
 
The ‘spectrum’ of world politics that Keohane and Nye perceive is between the two ideal types 
of realism and complex interdependence, but the determinants for selecting an appropriate model 
of analysis are not clearly defined and situations that would be regarded as ‘in-between’ are also 
not accurately identified.  Therefore,  complex  interdependence is  critiqued  for its  ambiguity 
(Zheng, 2014: 38–9). 
 
1.6      Synopsis of chapters 
 
Chapter Two provides an historical background spanning from the colonial era to the apartheid 
era. Consideration of the colonial context allows one to understand challenges that have persisted 
up until today. The run-up to Lesotho’s independence and thereafter is elaborated on in relation 
to the competing political parties, and how this complicated bilateral relations, as Lesotho had to 
maintain relations with the apartheid government while Lesotho accommodated ANC exiles. The 
chapter shows how the asserted dominance of the apartheid regime, further complicated by 
Lesotho’s  extreme  dependence  on  South  Africa,  meant  that  Lesotho  was  forced  to  forge 
cooperative relations with its only neighbour. 
 
 
10 
Realism has a parsimonious emphasis on self-interest and can be applied in more cases (Keohane & Nye: 2000: 
115).
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Chapter Three is centred on themes pertaining to migrant labourers’ (from Lesotho) generation of 
remittances. General themes include the Lesotho ‘labour reserve’ for South African mines up 
until the 1990s; sensitivity dependence factors and the decline in employability of Basotho in 
South Africa and how this has impacted on remittance gains; and the increase, persistence and 
changed trends of Basotho immigration due to factors such as survival at the household level in 
Lesotho, the demise of apartheid, the 2002 Immigration Act and illegal migration. Related to 
labour migration is the shared cultural Basotho community between South Africa and Lesotho 
and the border, where these themes form part of interdependent interactions. 
 
Chapter Four explores Lesotho’s regional economic agreements including the CMA and more 
importantly SACU. SACU’s and the post-apartheid reform of the Revenue-Sharing Formula 
(RFS) and institutional frameworks are addressed. More importantly, this chapter explores the 
considerable reliance of Lesotho on the revenue generated from SACU, and the sensitivity and 
vulnerability dependence related to issues such as the extent of Lesotho’s dependence, economic 
fluctuations and the economic ‘convergence’ of the two countries. 
 
Chapter Five addresses the means by which the LHWP dam scheme signals interdependence 
between Lesotho and South Africa. Interdependence concepts and ideas from complex 
interdependence are applied more thoroughly in this chapter, Operation Boleas and Lesotho’s 
political culture is explored, drawing upon the role of military involvement of South Africa and 
the protection of the countries interests, but also the persistent internal political instability in 
Lesotho. 
 
Chapter Six provides an overall assessment and conclusion.
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Chapter 2: Historical background 
 
 
2.1      Introduction 
 
The following chapter provides an extensive history of Lesotho and the region. From the period 
as a British protectorate, one is able to see Lesotho’s unique predicament that largely set the 
stage for its high dependence on South Africa that has persisted up until today. Upon gaining 
independence in 1966, Lesotho was challenged with maintaining a relationship with apartheid 
South Africa to sustain its economic transfers, while trying to resist South Africa’s assertive 
dominance. This relationship was further complicated or ‘intensified’ due to the establishment of 
the interdependent relationship from South Africa’s desire for augmented water supplies to be 
supplied from Lesotho. 
 
2.2      Basutoland: A British protectorate 
 
During the first half of the 1800s in the Zulu Kingdom, Chief Moshoeshoe gathered mainly  
Sotho-speaking  groups  during the  Lifaqane and  migrated  to  the lowlands, where he formed 
the Sotho kingdom – which eventually became known as Lesotho (Cobbe, 1983: 293). The Boer 
settlement along the Caledon River in 1834 threatened the independent livelihood of the Basotho 
as the Boers annexed territory, resulting in conflict over land that frequently occurred over four 
decades (McKenna, 2011: 93). From 1868, Moshoeshoe requested that Britain rule over the 
territory of Basutoland (as it was referred to until gaining independence), in order to safeguard 
territory against further Boer invasion (Ward, 1967: 357). The British reluctantly accepted the 
offer to rule Basutoland, as Moshoeshoe thought colonial rule would protect the Basotho 
Kingdom. Much territory had been lost to the Boers’ Orange Free State (OFS) by 1868 and, in 
1869, the Treaty of Aliwal North confirmed territory seized by the Boers as part of OFS and 
declared the boundaries of Basutoland, a landlocked nation-state (Lemon, 1996: 265). The 
defined territory forced the Basotho to move off lands annexed by the OFS, where a small 
territory housed an overpopulated Mosotho kingdom. In 1884, the British deemed its rule over 
Lesotho under the Order of Council of 02 February 1884 (Van Wyk, 1967: 
7). As shall be demonstrated in the dissertation, Lesotho’s landlocked status played a critical role 
in confining Lesotho as a state within another state that eventually became the Union of South 
Africa in  1910.
14 
 
 
The British intended to maintain low costs of administration and thus confined their rule as they 
paid no concern to the socio-economic wellbeing of their protectorate before the 1930s (Van 
Wyk, 1967: 7–8). European traders monopolised commercial activity in the early period of 
Basutoland’s rule as a protectorate right up until the 1990s. Surplus revenue accumulated from 
the 1910 agreements on customs and excise duties of SACU, export duties and taxation was 
frequently spent on ventures other than social and economic development. The main objective of 
the administrators was to maintain law and order (Ward, 1967: 355). The drafted legislation for 
the unification of four colonial territories stipulated general conditions for the incorporation of 
three British protectorates in the South Africa Act of 1909 (Van Wyk, 1967: 4). Potential 
incorporation was vehemently contested by the respective African leaders of the protectorates. 
Once the Union of South Africa in 1910 came into effect, South Africa’s anticipation to 
incorporate Lesotho remained, but with practices of segregation culminating into apartheid, 
traditional and new Basotho elite leadership united to become stronger in retaining their 
sovereignty (Lemon, 1996: 265). 
 
Under British colonial rule, Basutoland’s local economic landscape negatively altered from a net 
exporter of grain to an  underdeveloped and  impoverished land. Subsequent to the issue of 
agriculture,  sources of local employment declined and  a trend  emerged where the Basotho 
increasingly sought labour in South Africa. In addition, increased pressure to purchase imported 
commodities and the inability to pay local taxes forced many Basotho to seek employment in 
South Africa. From 1911 to 1956, the total male migrant population increased from 10.6% to 
29.4% and the female population from 1.3% to 10.2% (Bardill & Cobbe, 1985: 27). While the 
inclining trend of depleting agriculture and labour migration resulted in increased dependence on 
South Africa, dependence was enhanced by the need for ‘power, communications, transport, 
banking, currency, and customs revenue’, whereby some of these needs were eventually 
facilitated by revenues generated from SACU (Bardill & Cobbe, 1985: 27). However, by the 
time of independence, modern-sector services, industry and mining were, according to Cobbe 
(1988: 72), ‘non-existent’. 
 
This vital historical background complements further factors for consideration, as Lesotho’s 
period of colonial subjugation set the stage for its challenges as an independent nation-state. It 
was vital to show how Basutoland became an enclave and a poorly developed country that
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increasingly became economically dependent on South Africa for employment opportunities and 
revenue generated from SACU. 
 
2.3      Lesotho’s political independence and the establishment of an interdependent 
 
relationship with South Africa 
 
Repeated calls for representative government occurred in the 1940s and 1950s (Bardill & Cobbe, 
 
1985: 35). BCP, the expected victor, had radical conservations, held close links with South 
Africa’s Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and received aid from China (Weisfelder, 2014: 112). 
Surprisingly, the more conservative BNP narrowly came out victorious in the 1965 national 
elections with Chief Leabua Jonathan as the new Prime Minister. It is significant to point out 
these political developments to gauge the attitudes of the parties towards South Africa. A 
paradox arose where Lesotho’s entry into statehood was overshadowed by it being one of the 
poorest countries in Africa, if not in the world, with the two main parties separated between the 
BNP that was content with Basutoland existing peacefully alongside its only neighbour in 
contrast to those who resented the ‘high dependence’ on apartheid South Africa, but could not 
think of any viable alternatives (Spence, 1964: 441). Despite the BNP’s narrow  victory,  the  
first-past-the-post  (FPTP)  electoral  system  conferred  from  the  British colonial administration 
ensured that the BNP became the sole representative of government (Matlosa, 1999: 171). This 
early period during 1965 to 1970 is referred to as the ‘embryonic democracy’ with relative 
stability, but with a sour BCP which was both shocked and distrustful of the outcome (Matlosa, 
1999: 171). This early phase set the stage for later challenges affecting Lesotho’s internal 
politics to levels of conflict as the FPTP ultimately ensured one-party rule. These electoral 
details are significant up until today as shall be made clear later, it has been a crucial factor in 
consideration of Lesotho’s internal contestations of the unsuitable political systems bequeathed 
from the colonial administration. In addition, South Africa comes in as it has played an 
intervening role in Lesotho’s conflicts both in the apartheid and post-apartheid periods. 
 
Prior to 1963, Lesotho–South Africa border controls were non-existent. As the incorporation of 
Lesotho into South Africa became inconceivable, specifically due to the imposition of apartheid, 
the significance of Lesotho’s border increased (Weisfelder, 2014: 112). In 1964, the constitution 
adopted by Lesotho for its independence as a constitutional monarchy sealed the prevention of
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South Africa annexing Lesotho (Hassan, 2002: 2). In 1965, at Maseru Bridge on the side of 
Lesotho,  border controls  merely involved  signing a list  administered  by one policeman.  In 
contrast, in South Africa, the apartheid system was in full swing, with separate lines for white 
and black people. Several Africans were harassed in the case of the smallest irregularity of one’s 
documents. Africans waited tiresomely for services, whereas the white queues had faster and 
more efficient services (Weisfelder, 2014: 112). After Lesotho’s independence, South Africa 
restricted cross-border movements further. As a landlocked country, even at this time, Lesotho 
had been entitled to transit rights under international law. However, in the ‘national interest’, 
South African border authorities increasingly conducted cargo and passenger inspections to 
check for potential defence equipment (Bardill & Cobbe, 1985: 75). 
 
During his campaign, Chief Jonathan emphasised the importance of maintaining good relations 
with South Africa as a bread-and-butter matter. He also mentioned the opportunity of partnering 
with South Africa to implement a dynamic credit policy and cooperative farming. Chief Jonathan 
regarded friendly relations with South Africa as a realistic matter of survival for continued 
migrant employment as well as trade, despite South Africa being an apartheid state that he was 
morally in dispute with (Weisfelder, 2014: 112). More significantly (for the purpose of this 
dissertation), he mentioned the establishment of the Oxbow Hydroelectric Scheme (later referred 
to as the Lesotho Highlands Water Project), which also speaks to the sensitivity of South Africa 
and the fact that Lesotho had a vital resource for the economic growth of South Africa, namely 
water, to strengthen friendly diplomatic relations to the benefit of both countries. 
 
On 4 October 1966, Basutoland assumed the title of Lesotho as a newly independent nation- 
state. BNP, under King Moshoeshoe II and Chief Leabua Jonathan as Prime Minister, celebrated 
independence. These leaders inherited the difficult task of administering an LDC with a 
rudimentary infrastructure. Once relinquished of its administrative duties, British interaction with 
regards to Lesotho’s development was further diminished to aid (Ward, 1967: 355). It is argued 
that, once Lesotho gained independence from the British colonial administration, the level of 
dependence on South Africa increased. In addition to Lesotho’s increased dependence on South 
Africa, the strangling grip of Pretoria became increasingly overt over Lesotho from thereon. 
Pretoria exercised unilateral application of its superior military, economic and administrative 
capabilities  (Weisfelder,  2014:  112).  Ward  (1967:  355)  describes  how  Lesotho  became  an
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‘economic hostage’ to South Africa to an even larger extent after independence. The 1910- 
established SACU generated revenue that in turn allowed for the purchase of commodities, 
telecommunications and transport by Lesotho, meant that it was a no-brainer for Lesotho to 
maintain stable diplomatic ties with the apartheid government. Besides SACU and Lesotho’s 
dependence on employment in South Africa, South Africa also provided electoral assistance to 
Basutoland in the run up to the 1965 elections and, from 1967 to 1973, South Africa provided 
military assistance to Lesotho, assisting Jonathan in building the Police Mobile Unit (Weisfelder, 
2014: 112). These factors of dependence forced Lesotho to forge friendly relations with the 
apartheid regime. As the apartheid government’s hostility increased and presented itself in overt 
forms such as P.W. Botha’s ‘total strategy’ and assassination missions, Lesotho’s dependence 
was unapologetically manipulated through coercive measures to force Lesotho into compliance 
(Weisfelder, 2014: 113). 
 
Originally proposed by the British High Commissioner for Lesotho while still a British 
protectorate, economists advocated the idea of the heavy rainfall in Lesotho as an opportunity 
where water could be sold for currency (Ryan, 2015: 243). To this day, South Africa’s semi-arid 
climate results in socio-economic vulnerability under water-stressed periods. Recorded droughts 
from the early nineteenth century, of both summer and winter rainfall, in South African regions 
show exceptional conditions of below average rainfall that have played a role in socio-economic 
harm (Schwabe, Albiac, Connor, Hassan & González, 2013: 18). From the 1950s, worsening 
trends in average rainfall resulted in South Africa’s increasing interest in Lesotho’s water and 
thorough assessments of inter-basin transfer schemes were conducted to augment water supplies 
(Abukhater, 2013: 151). Feasibility studies resulted in the first project proposals presented in 
1956 of what was called the ‘Oxbow Scheme’, a dual-purpose outcome of dams that would 
transfer water from the Orange-Senqu River to gold-mining industries in Gauteng and form part 
of a hydroelectric scheme, not only to serve to Lesotho, but to sell electricity to South Africa. 
However, this proposal was rejected by South Africa, sceptical of furthering interest in Lesotho’s 
water, firstly, as the idea of transferring water and electricity from an extremely poor and small 
country did not appeal to South Africa, and secondly, as Lesotho lacked the necessary 
infrastructure to facilitate construction which would make it reliant on South Africa’s investment
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into the project (Abukhater, 2013: 152). Termination of ongoing negotiations was also as a result 
of disputes over setting the price of water transfers. 
 
Apartheid was the thorn in the side of Lesotho, and Charles Dube Molapo who was Lesotho’s 
Minister of Economic Development, mentioned the fears that an IBT scheme would mean for 
South Africa’s increasing economic power and the potential this could have for South Africa to 
impose the policy of apartheid in Lesotho (Turton, Meissner, Mampane & Seremo, 2004: 248). 
Such fears would not come to reality, because by 1968 South Africa had relinquished its pursuit 
of  incorporating  Lesotho  into  South  Africa.  However,  since  independence,  the  political 
landscape easily allowed for mistrust, motivating Lesotho’s efforts to preserve ‘political 
independence and national identity’ from the powerful South Africa’s apartheid policies 
(Abukhater,  2013: 153). Chief Jonathan stressed  Lesotho’s diplomatic  commitment towards 
South Africa in establishing a water transfer scheme, despite his moral sentiments towards 
apartheid,  pressure  from  domestic  groups  to  sever  ties  and  South  Africa’s  increasing 
international isolation. 
 
During the five-year democratic rule of the BNP, Chief Jonathan’s rule resulted in notable 
successes, including the initiation of various agricultural projects, the paving and reconstruction 
of  a  portion  a  large  south–north  highway and  the  erection  of  a  major  hotel,  as  well  as  a 
considerable increase in foreign aid (Rosenberg & Weisfelder, 2013: 10). Of course, such 
improvements were not nearly enough to prevent subservience to South Africa. Jonathan’s early 
rule is characterised by Matlosa as an ‘embryonic democracy’, but the BNP’s manipulation of 
the military into stringently maintaining its rule despite its loss to the BCP in the 1970 elections, 
sowed the seeds of future political instability in Lesotho. 
 
It was in the 1970s that Jonathan’s wavering compliance with South Africa eventually resulted in 
direct  conflict.  A  turn  in  Jonathan’s  rule  was  signalled  by  his  changed  direction  in  his 
relationship with Pretoria in 1971. In 1976, South Africa had decided to transfer the authorities 
of the Transkei border posts with Lesotho to the Bantustan authorities. A dispute arose as 
Lesotho declined to recognise Transkei, a South African ‘homeland’, as an independent state 
(Williams  &  Hackland,  2015:  216).  In  1978,  South  Africa  enforced  harsh  border  controls 
between the Transkei and Lesotho. This crisis led to Jonathan appealing to the United Nations
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(UN) for international aid, as the border closing partly aimed to economically debilitate Lesotho. 
South Africa organised numerous military raids in their attempt to batter Lesotho into banishing 
the ANC. 
 
As a result of the border controls, Lesotho established diplomatic ties with the Mozambique 
Liberation Front (FRELIMO). As a result of Lesotho’s persistence in seeing the Transkei as 
administered by Pretoria, FRELIMO’s Joaquim Chissano mentioned the importance of mutual 
cooperation to consolidate independence (Henderson, 1982: 3). The Foreign Minister of Lesotho, 
Charles Malapo, took part in discussions in Maputo as a return courtesy call, eventually resulting 
in Jonathan visiting Mozambique in 1978. Weisfelder (2014:112) characterised this diplomatic 
venture as Lesotho’s ‘risky underdog strategy’ to build support. Such relations explicitly centred 
on strengthening African unity in retaliation to the colonial sentiments of the apartheid regime 
that also felt threatened by losing control of its ‘dissenting’ neighbours. What further alarmed 
and angered the apartheid regime was that Jonathan established diplomatic links with Cuba, the 
Soviet Union and other communist states. Jonathan rejected Botha’s propositions of a non- 
aggression pact and the Constellation of Southern African States. Instead, Jonathan supported the 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the Frontline States 
group, both of which were founded on the political basis to unite in retaliation to South Africa’s 
asserted dominance (Weisfelder, 2014: 113). SADCC also aimed to unite to consider means to 
reduce economic dependence on South Africa. 
 
By 1979, the cycle of conflict in Lesotho’s internal politics commenced as Ntsu Mokhehle’s 
faction of the BCP, called the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), initiated an insurgency 
(Rosenberg & Weisfelder, 2013: 11). Ironically, yet conveniently, the LLA established ties with 
the apartheid regime. This was South Africa’s strategic counter to the BNP’s newly established 
links with the ANC. With the incentive of increased influence in Lesotho and a cooperative 
relationship, South Africa provided the LLA with logistical assistance and access to the borders, 
and even accommodated Mokhehle by providing sanctuary at the infamous Vlakplaas counter- 
insurgency base. It is significant that, by 1977, rising gold prices combined with the peak in 
Mosotho migrant workers on South African mines generated a notable increase in customs 
revenue and remittances that alleviated political pressures on the BNP. As a ‘pleasure periphery’, 
Lesotho was also an attractive tourist destination where South Africans could engage in activities
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outlawed in South Africa, for example, interracial relationships (Rosenberg & Weisfelder, 2013). 
As a coercive strategy to pressure Lesotho, South Africa reduced migrant labour recruitment and 
ended the subsidisation of Lesotho’s grain products. This economic coercive measure convinced 
Jonathan  to  meet  Botha.  In  August  1980,  the  counterparts  met  at  the  Peka  Bridge  border 
crossing. However, these negotiations failed to culminate in a lasting agreement (Weisfelder, 
2014:  113).  In  addition,  media  reports  of  the ongoing  violence  crippled  Lesotho’s  tourism 
 
industry. 
 
 
An abrupt end to any meaningful compromise was signalled by the 1982 apartheid officials’ 
assassination of ANC exiles on Lesotho’s soil (Weisfelder, 2014: 113). Thus, in 1983, Chief 
Jonathan threatened to completely halt any potential water transfer negotiations. In retaliation, 
South Africa threatened to militarily invade and placed economic pressure on Lesotho to force 
the highly dependent country into subservient behaviour (Weisfelder, 2014: 113). Further border 
controls were unilaterally imposed, resulting in food shortages in Lesotho. Thus, South Africa 
was able to successfully economically coerce Lesotho into acting, as Lesotho expelled 3 000 
refugees from Lesotho, many of whom were already exiled from South Africa. Despite this, 
South Africa continued to impose new border restrictions in January of 1986, as it demanded that 
all ANC cadres be expelled from Lesotho (Williams & Hackland, 2015: 216). 
 
Then in 1986, Jonathan’s 20 years as prime minister came to a reckless end as Lesotho’s army 
general, Justin Lekhanya, ousted Jonathan in a coup d’état. It is unclear as to whether Lekhanya 
was assisted by the apartheid regime, but many speculators were convinced of South Africa’s 
assistance in the plot to oust Jonathan. Days prior to the coup, Lekhanya had met with the South 
African government in Pretoria (Abhukater, 2013: 172; Weisfelder, 2014:). What was clear was 
that, once Lekhanya took office, relations between the neighbours stabilised and, in that very 
year, the LHWP Treaty was signed. 
 
With the signing of the treaty, the ties between South Africa and Lesotho ‘intensified’ (Lemon, 
 
1996: 266). Similar to critiques of the undemocratic nature of SACU’s 1910 and 1969 RSF and 
decision-making  mechanisms,  it  has  been  argued  that  South  Africa  had  more  leeway with 
regards to the formulation of the LHWP. While political officials on both sides generally 
welcomed the treaty, it was not devoid of criticism. Sceptics from both countries perceived
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Lekhanya’s wilful acceptance of the LHWP as a ‘sell-out’ (Abhukater, 2013: 172). At the local 
level, Basotho perceived the treaty as a means to manipulate and control Lesotho’s water 
resources. Despite the dual-purpose of the LHWP to provide water to South Africa and to 
develop hydropower for Lesotho, the project was critiqued as being detrimental to Lesotho’s 
development. Nonetheless, LHWP was also considered as vital to Lesotho due to its generation 
of employment, customs revenue, a new income source, an opportunity to be energy efficient 
and  benefit  from  infrastructural  developments  (Cobbe,  1988:  80). From  this point  relations 
continued to improve. Regionally hostility was relaxed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
with F.W. de Klerk’s speech on 06 February 1990, which emphasised the importance of 
cooperation to replace the ‘season of violence’ (SAHO, 2015; Meissner, Mampane, Seremo & 
Turton, 2004: 250). Under the evolving climate of the negotiated settlement underway since the 
late 1980s, the former adversaries, the ANC and the National Party (NP), became negotiating 
parties in the anticipation of the democratic elections of April 1994. 
 
As apartheid came to an end, scholars were curious as to whether the relationship between South 
Africa  and  Lesotho  would  result  in  a  continuation  of  the  various  regional  and  bilateral 
agreements. In the 1991 article, titled ‘What will happen after apartheid goes’, Cobbe considered 
Lesotho’s various indicators of dependence and the fact that a new government would likely 
usher in more friendly relations. However, the future trajectory was unclear, especially with 
regards to regional economic agreements. Some of Cobbe’s predictions are considered further in 
the dissertation, but as his time focus of predictions are now also points of history, it can be 
mentioned that various reforms have taken place with the new government in power that 
represents a bilateral relationship that is a far shift from the apartheid’s coercive ‘style’, but the 
nature of extreme dependence has not witnessed a fundamental shift.
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Chapter 3: Migrant labour, remittances 
and the ‘shared community’ 
 
3.1      Introduction 
 
The following chapter explores the underlying themes of migrant labour and the extreme reliance 
of Basotho on either employment or remittances. A brief history of Mosotho labour migration to 
South Africa is presented. South Africa’s internalisation policy is a significant theme that 
reflected Lesotho’s sensitivity dependence. Yet as the chapter goes on, the web of challenges 
faced by both countries with regards to remittances and the persistence of Mosotho immigrants 
becomes apparent. The dissertation also briefly explores three main developments or 
consequences and changes in trends that occurred as a result of South Africa’s reduction in 
foreign labour in the mining sector. While the apartheid government used the reduction of 
Mosotho labourers as a coercive measure, the post-apartheid government’s actions span over 
three decades where policies and trends are mixed yet determined a different set of priorities and 
influences than the apartheid government. 
 
Then, this dissertation explores relations in terms of culture and language, where one could argue 
that the ‘Basotho nation’ crosses the boundaries between Lesotho and South Africa. With a 
history of migration, complications with regards to citizenship and millions of Basotho nationals 
residing in South Africa reflect a sense of a ‘shared community’. Following on from this, but 
also tied into the ‘shared community,’ interdependence that exists on a micro-level is addressed, 
directly between the Free State border and Lesotho. 
 
Take note that there are information gaps on diaspora statistics and various issues with regards to 
identification creates problems to accurately measure migrant movements. 
 
3.2      The mining sector & the decline of foreign labourers in mining 
 
Migration has historically been an intrinsic factor of South Africa with a marked increase of 
labour migration  stretching back  to  the nineteenth  century (Tati,  2008:  424). Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Malawi and Lesotho were peripheral countries all characterised as ‘labour reserves’, 
serving  as  a  source  of  cheap  labour  to  the  gold,  diamond  and  other  mining  industries.
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Historically, labour migration has accounted for the main pattern of movement, where migration 
flows mainly consisted of unskilled and semi-skilled male labourers. 
 
For many Basotho across the country, migrant labour in South Africa is a fundamental means of 
survival (Wallman, 1976: 105). With the late nineteenth-century mineral revolution in South 
Africa,  an  increased  demand  for  labour  attracted  Basotho  men  who  were  drawn  to  the 
opportunity of higher earnings in mining as opposed to local employment in Lesotho (Bardill & 
Cobbe, 1985: 20–1). As the lucrativeness of grain production declined, Basotho commodity 
dependence increased the imposition of debt and hut taxes, forcing Basotho to seek more 
promising wage earnings and employment outside of their poorly industrialised country. Thus, 
Basotho dependence on employment in South Africa increased and, by the 1960s, a quarter of 
the working age population (approximately 100 000) of Lesotho was employed in South Africa 
(Akokpari, 2005: 89). Cobbe (1988: 72) states that, by the time of independence, about half of 
Lesotho’s adult male labour force was employed in South Africa. With South Africa’s Bantu 
Laws Amendment Act No. 76 of 1961, labour migration was institutionalised in the peripheral 
labour reserves, through the utilisation of labour bureaus such as the Employment Bureau of 
Africa (TEBA) (Tati, 2008: 424). 
 
After gaining independence, Lesotho became independent and Basotho increasingly relied on 
remittances from migrant miners (Rosenberg & Weisfelder, 2013: 249). Between 1963 and 1976, 
the number of men employed on mines in South Africa rose from 58 678 to 121 062. Surpassing 
Mozambique, by 1977 Lesotho became the main source of labour (Tlabela & Wentzel, 2006: 
75). By the 1980s,  Lesotho was regarded as  a ‘pure labour reserve’ as labour supply was 
 
reserved for a single industry in South Africa: mining (Bardill & Cobbe, 1985: 80). 
 
 
A 1986/87 nationwide survey revealed that remittances from mining migrant workers accrued for 
 
‘44.7% of total household [income], and for 52.7% for rural household income’ where ‘35% of 
all households, and 37.4% of rural households’ relied on remittances from migrant mineworkers 
as the main source of income (Cobbe, 1991: 20). Cobbe’s article, published in 1988 and titled 
‘Economic aspects of Lesotho’s relations with South Africa’, claimed that more than half of 
Lesotho’s gross national product (GNP) relied on the employment of Basotho migrant workers 
(Cobbe, 1988: 76). Data comparing annual migrant earnings as a percentage of GDP shows an
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increase in the 1980s of migrant earnings, with slight declines in 1985 and 1988. By 1990, 47% 
of the country’s GNP was accumulated from migrant remittances (Cobbe, 2012). Therefore, in 
macroeconomic terms, it is suggested that the latter half of the 1980s presented an increased 
dependence on remittances accrued from migrant labour (Cobbe, 1991: 22–3). At the time of 
Lesotho’s high dependence, scholars emphasised the dangers and sensitivity of relying on 
remittances.  Speculations  emphasised  the  instability  of  relying  on  external  sources  for  the 
national budget. 
 
In the 1980s, a high unemployment rate of black males in South Africa was estimated at various 
levels from half a million upwards. This indicated that the elimination of migrants would be easy 
as plenty of South African citizens were willing to be employed in this sector (Bardill & Cobbe, 
1985: 80). Such high dependence on employment in South Africa was used as an instrument of 
economic pressure during the apartheid years to make the Mosotho government more compliant. 
As mentioned earlier, Botha reduced the amount of Basotho as mineworkers as a coercive 
strategy, convincing Jonathan to meet with Botha to negotiate peaceful relations. However, the 
end of apartheid saw a more notable reduction in migrant mineworkers from Lesotho due to 
South Africa’s internalisation policy. The norm of labour migration meant that mainly Basotho 
men became accustomed to a culture of mobility. Not long after Cobbe (1988: 76) emphasised 
the extreme sensitivities Lesotho would face at the possibility of a reduced demand for Mosotho 
labour, this ‘fear’ became a reality. In the 1990s, migrant workers from Lesotho in mining in 
South Africa steadily declined  following large-scale retrenchment  due to  advancements  in  
mining mechanisation, gold mining’s relative stagnation and an internalisation policy that 
prioritised labour opportunities in South Africa for its citizens (Akokpari, 2005: 89; Cobbe, 
2012). 
 
The internalisation policy was cost-effective for mining companies who no longer had to rely on 
recruitment agencies (Maphosa & Morojele, 2013: 163). Although varied statistical data exists 
on South Africa’s unemployment rates and the shortfall in registering the unemployed, it is safe 
to say that there have been sustained high levels of unemployment in South Africa (OECD, 
2010: 93). Some analysts estimated that the mid-1990s unemployment rate in South Africa was 
as high as 50%. Some analysts estimate that unemployment rates were lower at 30%, while other 
analysts are sceptical of both ‘guestimates’ and cite lower numbers (Sender, Standing & Weeks, 
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1996:  107).  Tati  (2008:  423)  mentions  how  a  major  challenge  for  the  ANC  was  how  to
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implement an immigration policy regime that suited the developmental and transformative needs 
of the country it governed. In addition, South Africa had a population estimated at around 38.9 
million in comparison to Lesotho’s population of around 1.78 million. Therefore, high domestic 
unemployment meant that the ANC prioritised labour in terms of the state’s self-interest while 
also introducing amnesty legislation for Basotho workers to obtain. 
 
In  1995  and  1996,  South  Africa  implemented  amnesty legislation  in  order  to  grant  labour 
migrants permanent residence (Cornellison, 2007: 132). This ‘amnesty ruling’ would be granted 
to those who resided in South Africa up until the inception of democracy in 1994 (Kok, 2006: 
56). One could be granted citizenship regardless of one’s initial immigration status. While it is 
difficult to discern the amount of applicants who benefited, there was a particularly high amount 
of applicants from Lesotho. Among all mineworkers in South Africa in 1995, 55% of Basotho 
applied, in comparison to other amounts that were also high yet lower than the Basotho. For 
example, 40% of Batswana, 39% of Mozambicans and 44% of Swazis had applied for amnesty. 
Around two-thirds of the amnesty applicants were citizens from Lesotho, followed by Swaziland, 
Mozambique and Botswana, each with around 8% of the applicants. Such a high number of 
applicants from Lesotho emphasises its extreme dependence on its only neighbour (Oucho, 2006: 
56). 
 
 
The increased price of gold in 2001 placed a temporary halt on the declined demand, but migrant 
mining  labourers  from  Lesotho  continued  to  decline  where  in  2000  some  58 000  migrant 
Mosotho mineworkers decreased to 46 000 in 2006. From 2002, no more Mosotho novices were 
employed  on  the  mines.  By 2005,  the  bulk  of  mineworkers  were  older,  more  experienced 
Basotho. Mineworkers under the age of 25 accounted for less than 3%, fewer than 11% were 
under the age of 30 and more than half of the miners were over 40 (Crush, Dodson, Gay, Green 
& Leduka, 2010: 13). By 2010, one estimated number of Mosotho migrant mineworkers was as 
low  as  43 000  (Cobbe,  2012). Retrenchment  had a devastating effect  as  the households  in 
Lesotho lost their income. One estimate claimed the deferred transfer scheme during the early 
1990s remitted an average of R20 million a month from about half a million Basotho nationals 
working in South Africa (Khonje, 2015: 309); this illustrates the substantial income mining 
labour had for households in Lesotho. Furthermore, the proportion of households in Lesotho that
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received income from at least one family member on the mines dropped from about 50% in the 
early 1980s to 12% in 2002 (Crush et al, 2010: 12). 
 
The 1995/96 amnesty applications were a means to deal with illegal migration and the miners 
who would be retrenched were deemed unsuccessful, but South Africa’s popularity as a 
destination based on livelihood opportunities means that immigration has been a persistent factor 
(Cornelissen, 2007: 133). 
 
Therefore, what was once a norm for many decades among young males seeking employment 
became a ‘privilege’ to the few still granted the opportunity to work on the mines. It became 
more competitive for foreign labourers to seek employment on South African mines (Tati, 2008: 
425). Yet, mining labour still makes up a meaningful proportion of Mosotho immigrants and a 
large proportion of young immigrants forms part of the bulk of the economically active group 
with 87% of Basotho migrants between the ages of 25 and 54 years (Chikanda, Crush & Nalane, 
2012: 9). Ultimately, with years of foreign labour from Lesotho that is as long as the mining 
industry in South Africa itself, one cannot deny the contribution of foreign labourers to the 
survival of the mining industry that subsequently contributes to the development of South Africa 
(Akokpari, 2007: 72). South Africa continues to grapple with employment dilemmas as the 
‘Europe of Africa’ is a magnet for refugees and economic migrants, but has an excessive amount 
 
of unskilled labour with a shortage of skilled labour (Wöcke & Klein, 2002: 441). 
 
 
While complex interdependence presents globalisation trends of the twentieth century, 
incorporating the idea that migration transfers undermine the sacrosanctity of borders, Lesotho’s 
immigration history dates back prior to migration trends that coincided with globalisation. 
Migration triggers reflects a ‘repeat of history’ as typical triggers including a lack of cultivatable 
land, poverty, limited employment opportunities and low wage levels  persist as triggers of 
emigration (Khonje, 2015: 312). Such triggers resemble problems faced as far back as when 
Lesotho was a British protectorate. With South Africa’s self-interested internalisation policy, 
immigrants from Lesotho surely did not become redundant, but various consequences led to new 
trends that are addressed later on.
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3.3      Remittances & development 
 
In 1974, Lesotho’s government implemented the Deferred Pay Act in order to cultivate a savings 
culture among miners, but more importantly to ensure that more money earned by mineworkers 
would be invested and spent domestically (Chikanda, Crush & Nalane, 2012: 20). Remittances 
remain an essential safety net for households and remittance trends indicate that Lesotho remains 
a  labour-exporting  country  (Khonje,  2015:  316).  Remittances  was  earlier  addressed  in  the 
context of mining, but gains a more central focus here as an aspect of Lesotho’s dependence. 
 
Measured  in  terms  of  a  percentage  of  GDP,  Lesotho  is  a  leading  recipient  of  recorded 
remittances in the globe. In 2009, remittance inflows were 24.8% of Lesotho’s GDP, thereby 
making Lesotho the third largest remittance recipient after Tajikistan and Tonga (Chikanda, 
Crush & Nalane, 2012: 7). In 2014, the World Bank Factbook presented Lesotho as fifth in the 
category of ‘top ten remittance recipients’, where 17.4% of its GDP was accumulated from 
remittances.  In  2015,  in  the  category  as  a  remittance  recipient  in  US  dollars,  Lesotho 
accumulated $0.4 billion in third place after Jamaica and Montenegro (Eigen-Zucchi, Plaza & 
Ratha, 2016: 50). 
 
Although trends showed a decline in official remittance inflows of migrant mineworkers, 
remittance inflows have actually significantly grown over the past few decades. According to 
Crush, Chikanda and Nalane (2012: 7), between 1975 and 2010, remittances growth occurred at 
an annual rate of 5.5%. This growth is partly attributed to the higher average salaries of 
mineworkers that rose from M12 321 per annum in 1992 to M82 076 in 2008. Crush, Chikanda 
and Dodson (2012: 7) also contend that remittance inflows to Lesotho dominates over other areas 
of external  financial  flows,  such as  SACU  revenues,  foreign  direct  investment  and  official 
development assistance (ODA). In 2009, remittance inflows were officially recorded to have 
been seven times more than FDI, commercial service exports, and then three times more than the 
amount of ODA. 
 
Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) remittance surveys revealed the extreme 
dependence of households on remittances. The survey also revealed that more than 78% of 
migrants rely on sending remittances home at least once a month (Crush, Chikanda & Nalane, 
2012: 11). Through ensuring the household’s availability of cash, electricity, food, medical
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treatment and fuel, remittances are considered to demonstrably alleviate poverty (Chikanda, 
Crush & Nalane, 2012: 12). Homes reliant on remittances are known to have higher incomes in 
comparison to those who are reliant on other sources such as domestic employment and 
informal/formal businesses in Lesotho (Chikanda, Crush & Nalane, 2012: 10). This is argued by 
some to have a positive effect on development through raising household incomes, alleviating 
poverty, and then improving ‘household resilience’ on a general scale (Khonje, 2015: 311). 
 
A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) official emphasised that the many decades 
of labour migration have led to new skills brought home. In the rural areas, returning migrants 
have also brought home social remittances in the form of ideas, skills and expertise, which 
contribute to  local  development  (Khonje, 2015:  315). Officials  from  Lesotho’s Ministry of 
Labour contended that returning migrants provide experienced labour to low-skill segments of 
the market and also encourage entrepreneurship. Nonetheless, statistical evidence is difficult to 
retrieve and demonstrate the direct impact of social remittances on  Lesotho. While Khonje 
presents optimistic claims from interviewing political officials and  organisations,  a ‘bottom 
down’ approach  to  interviewing returning miners found that  the skills developed on  South 
African mines are irrelevant and returning mining migrants return home uneducated (Maphosa & 
Morojele, 2013: 154). Some scholars contend that migrant labour and remittances have had a 
negative effect on development and poverty alleviation. There is not much current evidence that 
suggests the generation of large multiplier effects on a local and national scale (Chikanda, Crush 
& Nalane, 2012: 15). Due to the immediate consumption needs that remittances are spent on, an 
insignificant amount is directed towards investment ventures. The reliance on South African 
foodstuffs and manufactured goods means that remittances promote the economic development 
of South African businesses and not Basotho businesses. 
 
Various studies have been conducted to discern the relationship between development and 
remittances in Lesotho; yet, they are based on mainly survey data and are not longitudinal. 
Motelle (2011: 241–51) conducted a longitudinal study on the nexus between remittances and 
financial  development.  Motelle’s  research  concluded  that,  while  remittance  inflows  are 
positively  related  to  financial  development,  they  did  not  have  an  impact  on  financial 
development and credit allocation. The results suggest that an improvement in the efficiency, 
quality and quantity of financial intermediation that draws formal remittance inflows (Chikanda,
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Crush & Nalane, 2012: 15). One challenge is the lack of utilising formal remittance transfer 
schemes. Not only is there poor financial infrastructure to facilitate formal channels of 
remittances, but migrant labourers also commonly utilise informal remittance channels. The 
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the Chamber of Mines of South Africa are not in 
favour of the compulsory deferred pay scheme. Human rights groups have also expressed 
discontent, because the scheme is considered a violation of migrant labourers’ rights to earn their 
full salary (Khonje, 2015: 319). Lesotho’s government is supportive of the scheme as it improves 
the  balance  of  payments  and  provides  foreign  exchange.  Furthermore,  household  surveys 
revealed that wives residing in Lesotho who are married to the mineworkers are supportive of the 
scheme for household income (Khonje, 2015: 319). 
 
There is a need for the governments of Lesotho and South Africa, recruitment companies, and 
the private sector to more thoroughly address the risks and costs faced by remittance patterns, 
while simultaneously considering issues related to skills enhancement, duration of stay, and the 
return and reintegration of migrant workers (Khonje, 2015: 319). Thereby, temporary migration 
could be orientated around human capital development. National frameworks of migration are 
also  regarded  as  insufficient  as  national  poverty  reduction  strategies  (Khonje,  2015:  319). 
Besides this issue, there are various other policy gaps related to rights of migrant workers and 
poverty alleviation. Such weak immigration policy undermines socio-economic development. 
 
3.4      Other migrant labour patterns 
 
Despite the decline in demand for foreign labour in South Africa’s mining sector, the twenty-first 
century witnessed a significant increase in labour migration from Lesotho (Khonje, 2015: 309). 
A census conducted in 2006 estimated the population of the country to be 1.87 million. By 2011, 
the population had marginally increased to 2.1 million, with 20.5% of the total population living 
outside of Lesotho. Accordingly, Lesotho is identified as a classical emigration nation. 
 
Lesotho’s enclave status and the fact that labour immigrants prefer South Africa as a suitable 
employment destination, make it obvious that South Africa would be the likely destination for 
many from Lesotho. In 2013, the Lesotho–South Africa migration corridor was one of the top ten 
migration corridors in the world (Eigen-Zucchi, Plaza & Ratha, 2016: 51). Such an extensive 
history of migration patterns reflects the idea of the fluidity of a nation-state’s borders. Lesotho’s
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poverty conditions and marginal employment opportunities mean that Lesotho remains a labour- 
exporting country. Despite the rapid decline in employing mineworkers and the arguable decline 
in the relevance of its contribution to remittances, overall migrant labour to South Africa still 
occurs in significant numbers. 
 
Khonje (2015: 313) identified three consequences of declined mining employment where new 
trends developed including diversification, increased female immigration and an increase of 
undocumented migrants. 
 
Diversification occurred as a result of Basotho seeking employment in other sectors in South 
Africa.  Despite  positive  indicators,  this  process  of  migration  still  presents  considerable 
challenges as various low-skilled migrant workers face exploitative conditions and are only 
afforded limited labour rights or difficulties in monitoring labour rights under the Labour 
Relations Act No. 66 of 1995 (Griffin, 2016: 27). In addition, Lesotho has suffered from a ‘brain 
drain’ as skilled professionals have sought employment in South Africa. With the demise of 
apartheid, the predicted migration did not occur as anticipated as South Africa’s internalisation 
policy was restrictive towards skilled immigration (Crush et al, 2010: 22). Those who did receive 
work in South Africa were either exceptionally skilled or were able to obtain identity documents 
and  residence  permits.  However,  with  South  Africa’s  own  ‘brain  drain’  concerns,  the 
Immigration Act No. 13 of 2002 came about as a means to address the increasing emigration of 
skilled South African workers (South African Institute of International Affairs [SAIIA], 1999: 2). 
Although there are limitations to this statistic as not all emigrants declare their intent of leaving, 
Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) revealed that 39 000 South Africans emigrated between 1994 
and 1997, of whom 36% were managers and professionals (SAIIA, 1999: 2). This reveals a 
reality that South Africa has been able to benefit from Lesotho’s skilled force at the expense of 
Lesotho’s skilled citizenry. 
 
Basotho  were  also  able  to  take  advantage  of  affirmative  action  programmes  and  the 
 
‘deracialisation’ of South Africa’s workforce, where speaking Sesotho, an official language of 
South Africa, has served in Basotho nationals’ favour (Crush et al, 2010: 22). Then, with the 
implementation of the South Africa’s Immigration Act of 2002, it became easier for skilled 
migrants to obtain work in South Africa. A SAMP survey conducted among final-year students
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at the National University of Lesotho (NUL) and other technical colleges revealed that 31% (or 
one-third) of students expressed interest in either permanently or temporarily seeking work in 
South Africa. As a destination, South Africa received the highest percentage of votes, with 
Botswana second with 25%, followed by United Kingdom at 10% (Crush et al, 2010: 23). These 
sentiments reveal the high likelihood skilled workers will migrate in search of substantially 
higher   wages,   stronger   advancement   prospects,   and   a  better  social   and   infrastructural 
environment in South Africa (Cobbe, 2012). 
 
Huge salary differentials between Lesotho and South Africa means that Lesotho suffers from a 
constant shortage of health professionals, engineers, accountants and various other skilled and 
semi-skilled occupations (Cobbe, 2012). The sector that has suffered the most from the brain 
drain is Lesotho’s health sector. The health sector has been undermined with over 50% of 
doctors, nurses, pharmacists and other health workers migrating out of Lesotho (Khonje, 2015: 
315). This is particularly concerning seeing as the Mosotho population’s increased prevalence 
and transmission of HIV is partly related to migrant mineworkers. A loss of such human capital 
defeats  the  purpose  of  those  health  workers  receiving  their  qualifications  through  state- 
subsidised education (Khonje, 2015: 315). Furthermore, as countries compete for skilled labour, 
poor countries such as Lesotho are ‘doubly disadvantaged’ in terms of limited capital as well as 
the restraints such ‘push’ factors have on their ability to develop a comparative advantage in the 
global neoliberal economy (Wöcke & Klein, 2002: 441). 
 
The second  consequence (which ties into the first) is that an increasing amount  of female 
labourers have sought work in South Africa from the mid-1990s, commonly in commercial 
farming and domestic service (Khonje, 2015: 313). In addition, apartheid’s demise saw the 
relaxation of laws that prevented female migration to South Africa, subsequently allowing more 
women in the tertiary sector to seek employment opportunities in South Africa (Maro, 2011: 40). 
While migration by women has considerably increased, it is still in much smaller numbers in 
comparison to men. Apartheid’s demise made it more convenient for women, but also Basotho in 
general, to find work in South Africa without the threat of constant deportation and harassment at 
the border (Crush et al, 2010: 14). Yet, harassment by police is still prevalent among police 
officials, especially if one is considered an undocumented migrant. Furthermore, it is considered 
to be more economically sensible for women to seek work in South Africa where for the same
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work they would receive less remuneration in Lesotho. It has been argued that if it were not for 
the  dramatic  employment  growth  in  Lesotho’s  textile  industry,  which  favourably  employs 
women, more women would likely have immigrated to South Africa (Crush et al, 2010: 20). 
 
The third consequence identified as a result of decline foreign miners, whereby many migrants 
returned to South Africa as undocumented migrants. Khonje (2015: 313) contends that most 
Basotho nationals migrate to South Africa utilising the legal means at established border posts, 
for example at the Maseru Bridge. However, there is an increasing stream of undocumented 
migrants. While this dissertation does not consider this thoroughly, this factor further emphasises 
the porousness of the border. Whether legal or illegal, the South Africa–Lesotho migration 
corridor is a persistent and inevitable factor. In response to this, South Africa has only recently 
introduced special permit legislation. Basotho, including those who currently work in South 
Africa illegally, can apply for the Lesotho Special Permit (LSP) if they worked, studied or 
conducted business in South Africa before 2015. The application date spans from 11 December 
2015 and 31 December 2016, and if successful, allows one to legally work and conduct business 
in South Africa. The permit is valid until 2020. According to Lesotho’s Home Affairs Minister, 
Lekhetho Rakuoane, the permit is ‘hailed’ by undocumented Basotho who can now work in 
South  Africa  without  being  harassed  by  police  officials  (Mohloboli,  2015b).  Although 
harassment may be difficult to monitor and police can still harass, Basotho will no longer be 
deported unless they have a criminal record or other immigration-related offence. More 
importantly, South Africa has implemented legislation that now caters towards unskilled or ‘low’ 
skilled migrants, such as farmworkers or domestic workers, as opposed to immigration policies 
that focus on skilled workers. However, a more detailed analysis of this policy thus can only take 
place after it has been implemented for a longer period of time. 
 
3.5      Citizenship, identity and the border 
 
The Basotho experience of being a part of South Africa economically and culturally, yet 
differentiated on a political basis, means that multiple fungible identities have been created and 
have persisted over time (Weisfelder, 2014: 110). This persistent factor of migration shows how 
the idea of the imperviousness of borders does not stand, especially in the case of South Africa as
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a popular destination for migrants in southern Africa. Transnational migrants live, work and even 
express political interests in more than one country (Levitt, 2004). 
 
Besides employment, Basotho travel across the border for business, cultural, religious and family 
functions. Prior to traffic backups that started in 2010, Mosotho nationals commonly travelled to 
South Africa for shopping purposes. At the same time, people from Free State towns such as 
Ficksburg and Ladybrand travel to malls in Maseru in order to purchase from South African- 
branded supermarkets and other shops. Weisfelder (2014: 110) contends that such interdependent 
interactions maintain a ‘strong sense’ that Basotho cannot consider themselves as foreigners in 
South  Africa;  however,  they can  at  least  acknowledge  that  they have  a legitimate right  to 
employment in South Africa. While it is not the purpose of this dissertation to discern attitudes 
of Basotho towards their place in South Africa, it is important to note that it is too simplified to 
discern Basotho as not considering themselves as foreigners in South Africa due to sentiments of 
a ‘rightful place’ in the country. However, what is important here is the high dependence of 
Lesotho. 
 
Although this dissertation utilises the term ‘Basotho’ to refer to citizens of Lesotho, regardless of 
 
ethnicity, the term is also used to refer to those of Sotho ethnicity (Rosenberg & Weisfelder, 
 
2013: 48). There are about four million Sesotho speakers who reside in South Africa as opposed 
to about two million in Lesotho. There may be ambiguity with regards to the term where one 
could even regard the Basotho nation, in terms of language or ethnicity, as extending to South 
African-born citizens. 
 
3.6      Overall assessment 
 
Scholars have commonly looked upon the issue of Mosotho mining labour as a debilitating and 
exploitative endeavour through the manipulation of Lesotho’s internal employment challenges. 
A nuanced picture has been provided here, revealing the complexity of this theme. Remittances 
are evidently a major factor of dependence for the basic needs of various households that gain a 
higher income. There is a conflict of interest between migrant labourers who want their full 
salary and the government of Lesotho that prefers the deferred pay scheme, but remittances 
ensure the survival of many families in Lesotho. While the development potential and benefits of 
remittances are ambiguous, the reality is that remittances are a financial crutch that sustains a
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degree of financial institutional relevance in Lesotho. While South Africa benefits from the brain 
drain, many Basotho have searched for higher wages and infrastructural environment in South 
Africa prior to apartheid’s demise. 
 
The state and relevant policies do play an obvious vital role in determining opportunities for 
migrants. Lesotho’s sensitivity has been triggered by South Africa’s internalisation policy and 
the Immigration Act of 2002 that sped up the brain drain. It is too simplistic to regard South 
Africa’s role as exploitative, but South Africa also faces unemployment challenges internally 
while having to deal with the regular inflow of migrants. Indeed, there are actors who exploit 
migrant labourers, especially illegal migrants. Whilst South Africa’s LSP legislation is an 
enactment in awareness of Lesotho’s employment dilemma, the benefits as such are not explicit 
as of yet. For a longer period, it was more challenging for semi-skilled or unskilled workers to 
obtain work permits. However, in regularising migrant labourers from Lesotho, it benefits 
undocumented Basotho with amnesty and among other benefits it can also arguably play a role in 
reducing exploitation. 
 
With a history of migration that spans over a century, what continuously emerges is the 
porousness of the borders as migration to South Africa is a persistent factor. Lesotho’s unique 
position as an enclave and for various other reasons already explored has not been a ‘black box’ 
within another state. What can be pointed out here is that the immigration to South Africa for the 
purpose of labour and remittances is a constant transnational factor. Not only does the transfer of 
labour reflect the fluidity of the nation-state and the border between South Africa and Lesotho, 
but other elements of mobility and Basotho in South Africa reflect a significant element of a 
‘shared community’. Yet, one cannot undermine the challenges faced due to borders as Basotho 
citizens seek labour outside of Lesotho.
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Chapter 4: The South African Customs Union 
 
 
4.1      Introduction 
 
The following section elaborates on the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) as another 
factor of Lesotho’s high dependence, in this case due to SACU’s revenue generation. Labour 
migration presented how strongly connected Lesotho’s economy is to labour prospects in South 
Africa. This chapter demonstrates the formal interconnection of Lesotho’s economy with South 
Africa’s economy as long-term institutional economic agreements dominated by South Africa. 
The evolution of SACU from its colonial origins of 1910, to the 1969 SACU Agreement and 
finally the 2002 Agreement is considered. After considerations of South Africa’s role on a 
regional level, Lesotho’s dependence on SACU for its national budget becomes the central focus. 
 
4.2      The colonial and apartheid iterations of SACU 
 
4.2.1   1910 
 
Although SACU can be traced back all the way to its 1889 Agreement, negotiated on behalf of 
British colony and one of the Boer republics, for the sake of brevity the analysis starts from 1910 
(Gibb, 1997: 73). The 1910 Customs Union Agreement (CUA) was the precursor to the current 
SACU arrangement. The colonial iteration allowed for the High Commission Territories to be 
members, as negotiated by Britain, albeit with diminished rights. The territories did not have 
their own customs administrations, but it was then not perceived as necessary as South Africa 
and Britain anticipated the incorporation of the territories into South Africa (Gibb, 1997: 74–5). 
The 1910 Agreement allowed for a common external tariff, the free movement of manufactured 
goods within the CUA territory and a revenue-sharing formula (RSF) among signatories. The 
RSF accrued 98.7% of the joint revenue to South Africa and collectively the territories received 
1.3%. Basutoland received 0.8%, Bechuanaland (Botswana) received 0.27% and Swaziland 
received 0.15% (Gibb, 1997: 75). 
 
The RSF was regarded as static and South Africa couched the benefits of the customs union. A 
primary purpose  of  the  customs  union  is  to  expand  trade  flows  among  member  countries, 
frequently at the expense of non-members (Andriamananjara, 2011: 113). Decisions were made 
unilaterally by South Africa, including state-centred protectionist policies or incentives for the
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expansion of businesses and industry, to the detriment of other SACU members. For example, a 
unilaterally imposed 1925 import substitution industrialisation (ISI) programme meant the 
Territories experienced trade diversion by buying more expensive South African goods as 
opposed to cheaper goods manufactured elsewhere. As a colonial policy, the governance of 
Territories in the operations of the customs union was in such a way that they were part of the 
integrated South African space economy (Gibb, 1997: 76). A primary goal of the agreement was 
for  the  promotion  of  economic  development  through  regionally coordinating  trade,  but  the 
development goals of the Territories were of least priority in the functional operations (Gibb, 
1997: 76; Rossouw, 2016: 5). By the 1930s, an increased amount of pressure was placed on 
South Africa for reform and, with the win of the Nationalist Party in 1948, it became clearer that 
the Territories would not be incorporated into South Africa. 
 
4.2.2   1969 Agreement 
 
Negotiations for a new agreement were delayed as the independence of the Territories was 
pending. After the dependence of the BLS (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) countries from 
Britain, these landlocked countries’ revenue concerns meant that they became increasingly 
dependent on South Africa and maintaining the RSF ‘benefits’ from SACU (Gibb, 1997: 75–6). 
 
Once the Territories gained independence, a new agreement was negotiated and signed in 
December 1969, establishing the SACU Agreement (Gibb, 1997: 75–6). The agreement was 
renegotiated with the apartheid government and the recently independent states of BLS were 
signatories. Although a de facto member, Namibia only became an official member in 1990 once 
it  had  gained  independence.  The  1969  Agreement  came  about  in  cognisance  of  the  1910 
Agreement that undermined BLS contribution to the revenue pool (Ngalawa, 2014: 147). The 
new RSF did lead to rapid growth in revenue in the early 1970s, but after the 1976 Soweto 
Uprising, oil shocks and ensuing fluctuations in the economy, sanctions against South Africa 
increased that resulted in a significant decrease in revenues accrued to the BLS states (Grynberg 
& Motswapong, 2013: 7). Thus, a stabilisation formula was introduced in 1976 to address BLS 
concerns, resulting in a formula that ensured support if revenues accumulated from the common 
revenue pool (CRP) were less than 17% and accumulated revenue could not surpass 23%. 
Negotiating parties remained desirous of the free interchange of goods between borders and the
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application of the same trade and tariff regulations to trading partners outside the customs area 
(Rossouw, 2016: 5–6). Eventually, all members considered the agreement as heavily flawed as 
South  Africa  still  unilaterally  determined  the  external  tariff  policy  of  the  customs  union. 
Effective procedures were not in place to deal with dispute resolutions or to ensure compliance 
of ‘reform’ measures (Rossouw, 2003: 6). 
 
Ngalawa (2014: 148) identifies two schools of thought with polarised viewpoints on the idea of 
dependence and SACU. The one school represents the ‘dependency’ school that is suspicious of 
SACU as a colonial iteration. The dependency school emphasises that South Africa has been 
able to take advantage of cheap resource extraction from BLS countries. Gibb and Treasure 
(2014:  820)  describe  the  apartheid  government  as  utilising  SACU  to  assume  the  role  of 
‘paymaster’ through a complex RSF that dispensed compensatory payments. Thus, the economic 
might of South Africa created and embedded a governance framework that gravitated around 
Pretoria. Grynberg and Motswapong (2013: 1) explain that, even though the 1969 agreement 
came about to correct previous imbalances, the RSF ‘perhaps intentionally’ created a fiscal 
dependence of the BLS states on South Africa. 
 
The other school  of thought,  referred  to  as  the ‘interdependence school’,  sees  SACU  as  a 
mutually beneficial, sophisticated and functional customs union (Ngalawa, 2014: 148). The 
interdependence school emphasises the benefits that SACU generated for all member-states and 
regards the CRP as a successfully implemented policy to compensate trade diversion and 
polarisation. In addition, this school attributes the survival of SACU to the ‘mutual gain’ enjoyed 
by all members. 
 
On the one hand, the interdependence school is too simplistic in not acknowledging South 
Africa’s power advantage within SACU, and the colonial and apartheid decision-makers that 
overtly created a customs union with unilateral control. In addition, the inequitable policies can 
be demonstrated by examples such as the trade diversion entrenched by South Africa’s import 
substitution policy and implemented in the 1920s. Another example is in 1968, just prior to the 
1969 Agreement, when the BLS share of trade rose to 4.1%, but the RSF remained static at 1.3% 
 
as  per  the  1910  formula  (Grynberg  &  Motswapong,  2013:  3–4).  Ultimately,  South  Africa
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prioritised ISI, not as an instrument for region-wide industrialisation, but as a policy purely for 
 
South Africa’s industrial advancement (McCarthy, 2003: 10). 
 
 
On the other hand, a degree of interdependence can be acknowledged, whereby the history of 
SACU involved South Africa prioritising its industrial policy with SACU as an instrument of 
industrial development (McCarthy, 2003: 23). Even more recently, scholars such as Gibb 
acknowledge the economic domination of South Africa that is able to practise economic 
subordination  through  the  regional  organisation,  but  SACU  remains  the  only effective  and 
functioning case of economic regionalism in southern Africa (Gibb & Treasure, 2014: 821). 
 
Despite various discussions about the 1969 Agreement prior to 1994, there was no serious 
commitment to reform on behalf of South Africa. Although the diverse economies of each 
member are still a persistent issue, an asymmetrical interdependent relationship was developed 
through SACU where South Africa has been able to take advantage of divergent administrative 
capacities, development levels and economic capabilities of member-states in SACU (Kirk & 
Stern, 2003: 11). Ngalawa (2014: 148) states that there was no scope for convergence between 
the two schools of thought. However, it is tricky to apply each school of thought in its totality in 
the post-apartheid context when the newly elected dispensation inherited an unequally crafted 
system. 
 
4.2.3   2002 Agreement 
 
The  inception  of  democracy in  South  Africa  brought  about  a  ‘seismic  shift’  in  SACU.  In 
November 1994, renegotiations for a new SACU agreement began. The negotiations from 1994 
to 2002 were not merely based on reforming the RSF, but were predicated on establishing de jure 
equality for all signatory states (Grynberg & Motswapong, 2013: 9). Members of the newly 
elected ruling party, the ANC, were anxious for South Africa to depart from SACU due to its 
colonial origins, which Nelson Mandela described as based on a ‘colonial oppressor’s mentality’ 
(Gibb, 2006: 595). Although SACU remained, the ANC was quick to reject the power relations 
that underpinned the 1969 Agreement (Gibb & Treasure, 2014: 829). The lengthy negotiations 
reflected the difficulty Pretoria faced in balancing its ideological goals of, firstly, diminishing the 
extreme power imbalances engrained in the architecture of the 1969 Agreement, and secondly, 
sustaining stable development and South Africa’s trade opportunities.
39 
 
 
Finally, in 2002, an agreement was signed between South Africa and the BLNS states, providing 
a far more comprehensive agreement than the previous two (Gibb, 2006: 595; Rossouw, 2016: 
6). Overall, the following three provisions were stipulated to address the previous explicit 
architectural inequalities of SACU: governance and institutions, trade liberalisation, and the 
RSF. From this point, customs revenues have also been distributed according to intra-SACU 
trade, as a means to compensate for South Africa’s structural advantage in the union that results 
in polarisation effects (Alden & Soko, 2005: 372). 
 
The following focus is on assessing the ‘reform’ of the governance and institutions in addressing 
the ‘democratic deficit’, and the transformation of the RSF. With regards to the reform of 
governance and institutions, the 2002 Agreement was reformed to rightfully stipulate provisions 
for joint decision-making processes. The institutional architecture and governance mechanisms 
aimed to address the institutional architecture and governance mechanisms through establishing 
a ‘democratic’ foundation (Gibb, 2006: 595).11  Article 3 allowed for the establishment of an 
independent   administrative   secretariat   to   oversee   SACU,   namely   the   Customs   Union 
Commission (CUC) (Rossouw, 2016: 6). Articles 7 to 17 established six new institutions in 
SACU, including the Commission. The Council of Ministers assumed the role as the supreme 
decision-making body (Gibb & Treasure, 2014: 830). In terms of tariffs, the Tariff Board was set 
up as an independent institution where national bodies can provide recommendations to the 
Board that are considered. A symbolic break from the past was the relocation of the Tariff 
Board’s offices from Pretoria to Windhoek, Namibia (Gibb, 2006: 596). Thus, the reformations 
were set up to provide SACU with an intergovernmental nature, whereby decision-making would 
be based on consensus (Gibb & Treasure, 2014: 829). 
 
The 2002 Agreement presents a significant break from the past, but the ‘democratic deficit’ 
 
arguably  remains.  The  2002  Agreement  surely  represents  a  strong  contrast  from  the  1969 
 
Agreement that Grynberg and Motswapong (2013: 9) describe as one with ‘no pretence of 
equality’ as Pretoria enjoyed the prerogative of determining decisions. However, throughout the 
years there have been various indicators as to how South Africa is able to maintain and exercise 
its dominance. Problematically, the new democratic government of South Africa inherited a task 
 
 
11 
The word ‘democracy’ can imply that there is an electoral process, but this conventional notion does not apply to 
SACU.
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of maintaining but reforming SACU. However, the fundamental reality was that member-states 
had significantly different technical capacities to deal with issues of trade policy that could not 
merely be changed by a treaty alone (Grynberg & Motswapong, 2013: 9). 
 
The RSF was adapted by incorporating three separate components, including the distribution of 
customs revenue, excise duties and a development component (Gibb & Treasure, 2014: 830). 
The customs revenue is shared according to intra-SACU trade and, therefore, the country that 
imports the most within the union obtains the largest bulk of the customs union. Most of the 
redistribution to the BLNS from South Africa is based on the sharing of customs revenue. Excise 
duties are separated into the development component that constitutes 15% of excise duties and 
the remaining 85% is divided in proportion to a member’s share of GDP (Ngalawa, 2014: 150). 
 
Although the governance of SACU is dominated by South Africa, the RSF economically favours 
the BLNS (Gibb & Treasure, 2014: 832). The impact of the RSF on South Africa is argued by 
some to be problematic as it is regarded as unsustainable and burdensome. Kirk and Stern (2005: 
16–7) mention that the new RSF provides ‘greater security to the BLNS’, but it was expected to 
moderate the formula for the BLNS share of the pool in the future. In criticism of South Africa’s 
economic strength in SADC, Hervey and Schollij (2012: 336) describe how, at a sub-regional 
level,  SACU  member  states  are  provided  with  compensation  in  order  to  mitigate  negative 
impacts. However, the new formula is also problematic as Kirk and Stern (2003: 4–5) argue that 
it would sustain Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho’s dependence on the SACU revenues. 
Nonetheless, a SAIIA report by Chapman and Grant (2011) describes the argument that South 
Africa benefits from SACU to the detriment of BLNS as a myth, using the example of how in 
2008 South Africa generated over R45 billion towards the revenue pool that amounted to 98% of 
the revenue pool, but only received about R21 billion. Between 2009 and 2010, the RSF ensured 
that 1% of South Africa’s GDP was redistributed, where the intelligibility of such has been 
questioned as South Africa is itself a developing country (Gibb & Treasure, 2014: 832). Mzukisi 
Qobo argues that these funds provided to the BLNS are ultimately ‘development aid in disguise’ 
as the money comes from the same pool that could also be used to tackle socio-economic issues 
in South Africa (cited in Chapman & Grant, 2011). Makoa (2008: 68) quotes McCarthy when he 
states that, while the development component is small, the BLNS enjoy ‘protection against the
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decline in real value revenue pool resulting from bilateral and multilateral trade, and increased 
tariffs and duties’. 
 
Besides the RSF, a broader regional economic goal outlined in the 2002 Agreement is for SACU 
to be an instrument that facilitates cross-border movement of goods between member states, 
ensures equitable benefits, promotes conditions for fair competition, and enhances 
industrialisation and economic development (Rossouw, 2016: 6). Kirk and Stern (2003: 16–7) 
state that a challenge for the BLNS is to optimally utilise their received transfers from the 
sharing arrangement in order to improve competitiveness in the region. 
 
The BLNS are highly dependent on imports from South Africa, whereas South Africa relies on 
only a small share of imports from the BLNS (Flatters & Stern, 2005: 2). Thereby, the economic 
dominance of South Africa and SACU’s commitment to trade liberalisation leads to the 
functionality of SACU to be undermined as it is seen as a market for South African goods 
instead  of  facilitating  SACU’s  transformation  into  a  common  market  (Makoa,  2008:  63). 
Between 2000 and 2007, the formal share of intra-regional trade accounted for 6.5% to 10% in 
SACU, showing how trade between SACU countries is extremely low. In relation to intra-SACU 
trade, the BLNS receives more than 90% of their imports from South Africa, while South Africa 
receives a more diversified percentage of imports from each BLNS state, albeit a significantly 
lower portion. South Africa has a more diversified economy than the BLNS that brings up a 
criticism of the need for BLNS countries to aim towards diversifying their economies. However, 
diversification of BLNS economies is easier said than done. By virtue of the BLNS countries 
being in a customs union with South Africa, the BLNS can be described as captive markets that 
are victim to South Africa’s protective goods and the polarisation effects of the customs union 
(Prys, 2012: 94). Furthermore, comparing national development strategies shows that there is no 
harmonisation of industrial policies, with disparities in wealth, technological and industrial 
development, posing a major hurdle or even impediment to harmonisation of industrial policy 
(Makoa, 2008: 68). 
 
Weisfelder (2014: 120) points out that, while weaker SACU partners have undergone serious 
 
economic distress as a result of variations in SACU revenue, the ‘weaker’ partners are of the
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view that South Africa is doing little to alleviate their economic distress. In turn, South Africa 
remains concerned with its own share of customs revenue. 
 
4.3      Lesotho’s fiscal dependence 
 
Within the BLNS, Botswana is one impressive example of formidable economic growth that has 
transformed it from an extremely poor country to a middle- to upper-income economy, thereby 
making Botswana one of the lesser SACU dependents. Swaziland and Lesotho sit on the other 
extreme as LDCs that are two of the few countries in the world that are fiscally reliant on 
transfers from abroad. Lesotho is the most dependent on SACU revenues and the poorest country 
of SACU (Ngalawa, 2014: 146). As is shown below, not only is Lesotho’s expenditure affected 
by the amount available in the SACU revenue pool, but intertwined into this is the deeper 
monetary ties of Lesotho to South Africa. Ultimately, the wellbeing of Lesotho’s economy is 
largely determined by South Africa’s economic performance. 
 
Due to its membership within SACU as well as the CMA, Lesotho has little discretion in key 
policy-making processes. Although the CMA is not elaborated on in depth, it is important to 
briefly elaborate on the formal exchange union in the context of Lesotho’s monetary dependence 
on South Africa. Since the introduction of Lesotho’s currency in 1980, the Loti has been pegged 
to the South African Rand at par and the Rand has also served as the legal tender in member- 
states of the CMA (Aziakpono 2008: 190). Accordingly, Lesotho inevitably has similar interest 
and  inflation  rates  to  South  Africa,  of  which  such  ‘monetary  convergence’  is  perceived 
favourably by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Ngalawa, 2014: 149). Lesotho is sensitive 
to the fluxes of the flexible exchange rate of the Rand. Among the CMA member-states, the 
South African Reserve Bank (SARB) is the central bank that has the discretion in terms of 
monetary policy. Even though the union does have a commission and governors of the other 
central banks do meet to raise concerns, South Africa is not obligated to consult with the other 
CMA central banks (Aziakpono, 2008: 190; Weisfelder, 2014: 119).
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The open economy of Lesotho, its monetary integration in the CMA and its proximity to 
South Africa indicates how closely integrated Lesotho is into the regional and global 
economy. Its economy can  benefit  from  growth  spillovers,  but  these  linkages  also  
demonstrate  the  high sensitivity dependence Lesotho faces to its external environment 
(IMF Country Report, 2012: 8). Although  SACU  does  not  have  the  mechanisms  to  
ensure  that  member-states  utilise  their revenue strictly for development, a 2012 national 
economic assessment by the Central Bank of Lesotho (CBL) indicated the positive impact 
that an increase in SACU revenues has on the government’s expenditure as it is largely 
utilised to fund infrastructure and investment (CBL, 
2012: 4). With a reduction in SACU receipts, it is difficult for the government to use 
domestic tax as a substitute to SACU receipts; thus, Lesotho would have to opt for external 
assistance. 
 
Despite Lesotho receiving one of the lowest portions of SACU revenue, the receipts 
accrued from the CRP has made up a large amount of total government revenue: between 
half and two- thirds of the country’s income. Figure 1 (at the end of this chapter) provides a 
good perspective in comparing the amount of SACU revenue in comparison to other forms 
of revenue (CBL, 2012: 4). In 2001/02, CRP made up about 51% of the total government 
revenue (Ngalawa, 2014: 151). It then dropped to 48.6% of government revenue in  the 
2005/06  fiscal  year.  In  the 2008/09  fiscal  year, it increased to 64.66% of total 
government revenue. A significant reduction in SACU revenues as a portion of Lesotho’s 
income occurred in 2012/13, as it made up 44.9% of total government revenue (CBL, 2012: 
4). In the fiscal years of 2004/05 and 2007/08, excise and customs collections were 
consistently greater than anticipated as a result of ‘booming import growth in the  region’  
(Fontaine,  Verdier,  Benicio,  Mongardini  &  Pastor,  2011:  1).  The  ‘boom’  was regarded 
as a permanent increase and was largely used to finance recurrent expenditures, such as 
wage increases for civil services. Lesotho and Botswana were notably positively impacted 
as the fiscal surpluses generated gross international reserves at a comfortable level. 
However, this unexpected  increase  was  not  sustainable  and,  between  the  fiscal  years  
of  2008/2009  and 2009/2010, revenues (particularly collections from customs duties) were 
far lower than expected as a result of the 2008 global financial crisis. 
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With the negative impact of Lesotho’s fiscal position as a result of the crisis, SACU revenues 
significantly reduced to about 30% of total government revenue in the 2010/11 fiscal  year 
(International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2014: 1). The ‘liabilities’ faced in terms of vulnerability 
dependence were further budgetary cuts to an already low-income country. Therefore, while 
some have considered the possible benefits to a free-standing currency, some view the 
macroeconomic stability of Lesotho favourably due to its peg to the rand that has been 
successfully maintained. A freestanding currency could be risky as Lesotho has a small economy 
and  an  uncertainty  in  macroeconomic  factors  such  as  fluctuating  remittances  and  a  textile 
industry vulnerable to cheaper manufacturers in China (Weisfelder, 2014: 119). 
 
As mentioned, South Africa has the upper hand in decision-making. Intertwined with this issue is 
trade liberalisation. South Africa has acted unilaterally for the sake of its own interests, as 
evident in the formulation of the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). The 
TDCA was signed with the Europe Union (EU) in 1999 and has reduced revenue of an estimated 
US$350 million and reducing payments to Lesotho by 11 to 14% (Weisfelder, 2014: 121). South 
Africa could not form part of the interim Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in 2007 with 
the European Union (EU) that gave preference to less developed countries. SADC members 
including Lesotho did sign the agreement, resulting in a backlash from South Africa that 
contradictorily questioned sustaining the agreement outside of SACU parameters. Such 
overlapping agreements are highly questionable in terms of its benefit to Lesotho. On the topic 
of SADC, considerations of a SADC customs union are regarded by the IMF and Lesotho’s CBL 
as a serious threat to Lesotho as it would significantly reduce Lesotho’s share of revenue 
(Weisfelder, 2014: 119–21). 
 
South Africa has played a key role in negotiating trade deals such as the preferential trade 
agreement   with   SACU   and   the   Mercosur   group,   the   SACU–India   Preferential   Trade 
Agreement (PTA) and European EFTA group with SACU (SACU, 2016; Weisfelder, 2014: 121). 
While Lesotho is limited at the decision-making table, SACU benefits from South Africa’s 
superior bargaining power (Weisfelder, 2014: 121). South Africa is a key player in drawing 
global interest into SACU, in addition to other regional economic agreements in Africa. The 
Multilateral Infrastructure and Co-Financing Agreement for Africa came about as a result of a 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Summit. The agreement supports the co- 
45 
 
 
financing of infrastructure projects across Africa. Besides being facilitated by South Africa’s 
membership in BRICS, such projects are also facilitated by South Africa’s membership in the 
G20. South Africa’s leaders act as negotiators with heads of states, central bank governors and 
finance ministers from far more powerful economic players. However, one must also consider 
that within such organisations South Africa is still weaker than its compatriots and has less 
leverage in bargaining economic agreements for itself, let alone southern Africa (Weisfelder, 
2014: 2014). 
 
 
4.4      Overall assessment 
 
Thus, the evolution of SACU is vital to show how SACU was an instrument that was designed in 
favour of South Africa with marginal benefits to the BLNS. It then reformed with the arguably 
generous post-apartheid  RSF. South Africa’s newly elected government officials considered 
SACU as an unequal colonial iteration, but South Africa has still been able to prioritise its 
interests in a neoliberal global political economy. Theoretically, the BLNS are part of a more 
‘democratic’ regional agreement, but for various reasons (such as South Africa’s necessary 
capacities or expertise), South Africa remains the dominant decision-maker of SACU. 
Nonetheless, the BLNS and their national budgets benefit significantly whereas South Africa 
gains less than it contributes to the revenue pool. It is thus regarded as sensible for Lesotho to 
defend SACU, as without it Lesotho’s budget could suffer from debilitating effects. This analysis 
has also demonstrated the extreme level of dependence of Lesotho on South Africa, whereby not 
only does South Africa’s contribution to the revenue pool affect Lesotho’s economy, but also the 
currency peg. Such high dependence should be reduced due to the high sensitivity Lesotho faces, 
for example after the 2008 financial crisis. Arguably, the importance of SACU is such that some 
economic analyses  have  hypothetically considered  the consequence of  Lesotho  becoming a 
‘failed  state’  if  SACU  was  to  be  dissolved  (SAIIA,  2010).  Considerations  of  Lesotho’s 
development hindrances as a result of neoliberalism are beyond the scope of this essay. 
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Figure 1: Government revenue figures presented as a percentage of total 
revenue 
 
Source: Central Bank of Lesotho, 
2012: 4 
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Chapter 5: Lesotho Highlands Water Project 
and political instability 
 
5.1      Introduction 
 
The dissertation now approaches the fact that South Africa’s industrial heartland of Gauteng has 
been dependent on water transfers from the LHWP. Interdependence theory is applied in more 
detail than in previous chapters. For South Africa water transfers are the prime benefit, while for 
Lesotho the financial benefit is gained from royalties. After considering the benefits each state 
enjoys in relation to interdependence theory, albeit with criticisms, Lesotho’s recurring political 
turmoil is addressed with particular focus on Operation Boleas. This chapter explores the 
polarised debate on the nature of the military mission and further political crises while also 
considering the political culture of Lesotho. 
 
5.2      A reflection on interdependence 
 
5.2.1   ‘White gold’ 
 
With a semi-arid climate, South Africa’s freshwater resources are highly constrained. Since the 
 
1950s  South  Africa  has  experienced  an  intensity of  drought,  with  frequency,  duration  and 
occurrence increasing since the 1980s (Water Research Commission [WRC], 2015). In areas 
where rainfall is less than 500 mm, the socio-economic impact is likely to be severe. South 
Africa’s annual average rainfall is about 450 mm, making the country prone to the recurrence of 
droughts. The distribution of water is uneven, with some areas more stressed than other areas 
(Moseki, Ruiters & Tlou, 2011: 166). A common feature in southern Africa is that industrial 
heartlands of states are spatially distributed unfavourably when it comes to access to water 
resources. Urban settlements were developed by colonisers in response to opportunities for 
mining instead of proximity to water resources (Muller, Schreiner, Smith, Van Koppen, Sally, 
Aliber, Cousins, Tapela, Van der Merwe-Botha, Karar & Pietersen, 2009: 18). Pretoria and 
Johannesburg, in the province of Gauteng, are both economic powerhouses of South Africa, 
situated inland on a watershed between the Orange-Senqu River and  Limpopo River basin 
(Turton, 2008: 181). Due to the growth of the tertiary sector, the boom of energy provision, 
industrialisation  and  projected  population  increases  pressure  on  consumption  demands,  the
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scarcity of water on the Highveld in Gauteng became a growing concern. Therefore, in the 1950s 
water augmentation schemes had to be considered (Schreiner & Hassan, 2011: 7). 
 
Lesotho has had an abundance of water in its mountainous areas, holding the basin of the 
Orange-Senqu River (Turton, 2010: 36).
12 
Thus, an LDC has been able to offer a resource that an 
economic tiger in southern Africa has been dependent on. As mentioned in the historical 
background, the first feasibility plans for water transfers from Lesotho to South Africa were 
conducted in the 1950s to accommodate South Africa’s water-stressed environment (Abukhater, 
2013: 152). The apartheid regime’s political officials were reluctant to accept the plans as they 
were not comfortable with South Africa being dependent on a far weaker country (see Chapter 
Two). In 1966 and 1967, a drought occurred and the South African government realised that 
water transfers from the Vaal Dam located in the Free State were rapidly dwindling (Meissner, 
Mampane, Seremo & Turton, 2004: 242). South Africa was forced to reconsider inter-basin 
transfers and the LHWP Treaty was signed in 1986. In order to meet the demands of rapid 
urbanisation and industrial development, the LHWP became a priority for South Africa’s 
economic growth and Lesotho became diplomatically more significant to South Africa. 
 
This situation of South Africa being compelled to negotiate with Lesotho for its water resources 
reflects a situation similar to a factor that led to the rise of interdependence theory. The theory 
challenged the notion of states as wholly self-sufficient ‘black boxes’ and emphasised weaker 
countries having resource advantages over powerful countries. Thus, with South Africa’s 
dependence on water transfers from another country’s river basin, an interdependent relationship 
was established. As Keohane and Nye (2000: 118) more recently acknowledge, states remain the 
most important international actors, but possess a decreasing capability ‘to control their own 
destinies’ (Holsti, 1989: 12). Applying Keohane and Nye’s concept of interdependence and the 
reciprocity of states’ aims to describe how states that share resources and infrastructure are 
obligated to cooperate and how cooperation allows for states to enjoy long-term benefits over 
 
 
12 
While Lesotho has been seen to have an ‘abundance’ of water, Lesotho is also sensitive to the depletion of water. 
An impact assessment’s preliminary results, published in January 2016, revealed that Lesotho is facing a severe 
crisis related to water availability and food security (United Nations Office of the Residence Coordinator, 2016: 1). 
As a result of the El Niño drought, Lesotho’s government declared a state of emergency. The assessment predicted 
that just over 25% of households were not able to meet survival needs until June 2016; however, expectations 
further would worsen. The report also revealed that around 70% of households were not able to meet crop yield 
requirements due to low rainfall (United Nations Office of the Residence Coordinator, 2016: 2).
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time (Furlong, 2006: 445). These theoretical notions of Keohane & Nye complement the fact that 
without the deep-seated cooperation of the LHWP, this ‘feat of engineering excellence’ 
(Wentworth, 2013: 1) would not have been possible. 
 
There is an element of interdependence not only a bilateral level, but also on a regional level, 
where shared river systems reflect best as to how one should characterise SADC as a region as 
opposed to a collection of autonomous states (Hervey & Schollij, 2012: 346). Furlong (2006: 
450) describes how IBTs have been a decade-long feature of southern Africa due to the region’s 
water scarcity that has resulted in a high water demand in areas where water availability is low. 
Such large-scale projects are perceived as interdependence from the large amounts of investment 
in the engineering works and subsequent provisions for public goods. These public goods include 
human health, poverty alleviation, food security and economic development. Thus, growing 
interdependence has become a feature of SADC’s waterscape with IBTs being a durable and 
arguably growing feature of this waterscape (Furlong, 2006: 450). 
 
The second principle of complex interdependence stipulates the importance of ‘low politics’ 
themes such as ecological security that gain salience, as opposed to military security being the 
prime agenda of the state (Keohane & Nye,  1977:  24). With this  principle,  one sees  how 
Keohane and Nye (1977: 26–7) break away from the traditional realist concept of national 
security as a state’s safety from the threat of war. Instead, the contemporary non-traditional 
concept  of  security incorporates  threats  from  social,  economic,  political  and  environmental 
factors. Keohane and Nye (1977: 27) do refer to ‘ecological’ security, a term conceptualised 
broadly that can be applied differently, for example: the term can refer to natural resource 
interdependence or negative environmental factors where one country’s activities can affect 
resource availability of another country (Pan, 2016: 125). In this case, South Africa’s semi-arid 
landscape necessitates IBTs, the positive financial factors and industrialisation for Lesotho, as 
well as the negative environmental factors and impacts on sustainable livelihoods. While South 
Africa is seen to benefit, the outcomes for Lesotho is presented as a mixed bag of results in this 
analysis.
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5.2.2   Institutional cooperation 
 
As  a  bi-national  project,  equal  representation  of  the  two  countries  has  been  necessary  in 
decision-making processes. Although a joint technical commission was set up in 1978, prior to 
the Treaty, the formal implementation of the 1986 LHWP agreement required more rigorous 
feasibility plans (‘An African success story’, 2010). Three institutions were set up to oversee 
implementation: the Joint Permanent Technical Commission (JPTC), the Lesotho Highlands 
Development Authority (LHDA) and the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA). The LHDA 
was  set  up  to  oversee  all  project-related  activities  in  Lesotho,  including  construction, 
maintenance and operation of the dams, tunnels, infrastructure and power stations (Ramaili & 
Cloete, 2008: 118). The TCTA is responsible for the expenditure of the project and activities 
related to the project in South Africa (Haas, Mazzei, O’Leary & Rossouw, 2010: 3). TCTA, also 
responsible for certain management components of the project, was created by the then-South 
African Department of Water Affairs and Forestry – now administered by the Department of 
Water  and  Sanitation  (DWS).  The  JPTC,  later  renamed  the  Lesotho  Highlands  Water 
Commission (LHWC), holds responsibility for feasibility planning and implementation of the 
project. The LHWC takes on a role of dispute resolution and due to the different interests, 
whereby South Africa desires in alleviating the cost of water transfers and Lesotho’s economic 
interests, the LHWC acts as a mediator between competing interests (Abukhater, 2013: 158). 
Members from both the TCTA and the LHDA report to the LHWC, which holds bi-weekly 
meetings. These institutional roles present an intergovernmental approach that operates to 
functionally  organise  activities  for  the  necessary  implementation  of  such  an  intricate  dam 
scheme. Cooperation has been an imperative for such institutions to function effectively. 
 
Cooperation leads to implementation and outcomes 
 
The LHWP Treaty contained the feasibility of Phase I of the project and the next phases were 
negotiated thereafter (Haas et al., 2010: 3). In total, the LHWP consists of four phases and the 
first two are elaborated on here. Phase 1, divided into Phase 1A and Phase 1B, was completed in 
2004 (Bigala, 2011). The construction of Phase 1A started in 1991 and included the construction 
of two dams: the Katse Dam and Muela Dam on the Malibamatso River and Liqoe River 
respectively  (Meissner,  Mampane,  Seremo  &  Turton,  2004:  241).  The  Muela  Hydropower 
Station (MHS) was also constructed. Finally, Phase 1A also included the construction of 82
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kilometres of subterranean water transfer tunnels that transfer water to South Africa at 18 cubic 
meters per second (Haas et al., 2010: 36). Phase 1B feasibility plan aimed to transfer 11.8 cubic 
meters per second with the construction of another two dams: the Mohale Dam on the 
Senqunyane River and Matsoku Dam on the Matsoku River (Haas et al., 2010: 37). 
 
In August 2011, Phase 2 was approved in order to further augment water supplies to South 
Africa under increasingly water-stressed conditions and to augment electricity supplies to 
Lesotho.  Phase  2  involves  the construction  of  the  165-metre-high  Polihali  Dam  within  the 
Mokhotlong District and is expected to increase the volume of water transferred by 50% 
(Chimombe & Ngatane, 2015; Jacobs, 2012: 86; ‘SA, Lesotho start phase two…’, 2014). In 
addition, the construction of support infrastructure in Phase 2 includes the construction of roads, 
a 38-kilometre tunnel and the 1 000 megavolt Kobong pump. 
 
Prior  to  the  MHS,  Lesotho  was  wholly dependent  on  South  Africa  for  electricity,  but  the 
construction of the MHS has allowed for 299 kilometres of power lines (Kolver, 2014). In the 
late 1980s up until the early 1990s, high GDP growth rates were attributed primarily as a result 
of the LHWP. Annual fixed royalties were estimated to be about US$55 million and, after the 
completion of the first phase, the LHWP contributed to 28% of Lesotho’s government revenues 
and 14% of Lesotho’s GDP (Mirumachi, 2015: 91). By 2010, over 8.36 billion cubic metres of 
water had been transferred and Lesotho gained R3 091 million in royalties and R368 million 
from electricity sales (Cele, 2014; Haas et al., 2010: 5). The LHWP led to further infrastructural 
benefits for Lesotho, including newly built roads and road rehabilitation, the construction of 
eleven  bridges  (including three between  South  Africa  and  Lesotho) and  telecommunication 
services (Chimombe & Ngatane, 2015). 
 
The LHWP generated employment opportunities. Mashinini (2010: 3) presents two figures: one 
estimates that more than 7 000 jobs were created under Phase 1A with a total income of R380 to 
R400 million whereby the contracts won by Basotho were worth around R87 million, while 
another more moderate figure cited by Mashinini (2010: 3) estimates that 4 000 labourers were 
employed under Phase 1A. Haas et al. (2010: 5) mention that Lesotho benefitted from the direct 
employment of around 9 000 Mosotho nationals during Phase 1B.
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The interdependence of the scheme has been demonstrated in relation to the bilateral institutional 
mechanisms and outcomes of the transnational project. Besides the mutually cooperative 
outcomes of the LHWP, one can draw upon Keohane and Nye’s (1977: 9) conceptualisation of 
interdependence in terms of the high ‘costly impact’ if the flow of a good is prevented. The 
Orange-Senqu River is a key economic resource for semi-arid South Africa and a SAIIA report 
published in 2010 revealed that Gauteng’s gross geographic product (GGP) is 100% reliant on 
inter-basin transfers (Turton, 2010: 36–7). 
 
In the case of South Africa, with Gauteng supporting about 25% of South Africa’s population 
and generating around 10% of Africa’s economic output, if its inter-basin transfer from Lesotho 
were hypothetically stopped, then such economic output would not be able  to be sustained 
(Turton, 2010: 25). More recently, in 2015, South Africa faced its worse drought since 1982, 
affecting farmers and food prices, and further reiterating the sensitivity South Africa faces (Essa, 
2015). Turton (2010: 25) highlights how this dependence is particularly concerning in the event 
that future governments fail to ‘appreciate the need to invest heavily in operations and 
maintenance of infrastructure, rendering such economic development vulnerable to collapse’. 
The hydraulic infrastructure is thus pinnacle to South Africa’s economic development. 
 
As mentioned, South Africa’s dependence on Lesotho for an augmented water supply 
demonstrates a situation emphasised in the rise of interdependence theory whereby a state has a 
resource advantage over a state that is militarily and economically stronger. The difference here 
is that, while interdependence theorists provided OPEC as an example of how countries could 
band together and exercise power or have the means to independently influence outcomes suited 
to its own interests, Lesotho is obviously incapable of exercising such power. The asymmetrical 
interdependent relationship, due to South Africa’s superior military, economic capabilities and 
geographical location, inevitably forces Lesotho to sustain cooperation. 
 
Shortfalls and critiques of the benefits 
 
The criticisms of LHWP have to be addressed, as various scholars, environmental or human 
rights groups, and journalists have emphasised the negative impact of the project, for example on 
the livelihoods of the rural communities. Article 7 of the 1986 Treaty on the LHWP proclaims 
that the LHDA ‘will be enabled to maintain a standard of living not inferior to that obtaining at
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the time of the first disturbance’ (LHWP Treaty, 1986; Matlosa, 1998: 37). This commitment 
was not necessarily upheld and is even more problematic in consideration of the fact that the 
treaty was not subject to public debate before it was signed and was not informed by the interests 
of the local communities (Matlosa, 1998: 38–9). The mountain communities were affected by the 
loss of 1 900 hectares of arable land with the construction of the Katse and Muela dams, which 
affected about 2 345 households. The construction of the Mohale Dam led to a loss of arable land 
of about 1 000 hectares, which affected about 1 000 households (Mashinini, 2010: 4). Mountain 
communities had to resettle, losing their houses. A policy brief from the Africa Institute of South 
Africa (AISA) indicated that 25 households were forced to resettle and 46 volunteered to resettle 
(without stipulating the time period or due to which part of Phase 1). Mashinini (2010: 6) 
contends that the LHWP rural development programmes failed as an independent venture as 
opposed to being an integrated programme. For example, any form of irrigated agriculture by the 
rural communities using water from the dam is strictly forbidden. Besides the fact that a negative 
ecological impact of the dam is the reduction in the diversity of fish, fishing is inaccessible and 
highly regulated to small-scale fisherman (Mashinini. 2010: 6).  The poor compensation for 
losses can also be criticised. For example, resettled households during Phase 1 received R558.40 
as compensation which is considerably low in comparison to the sustainable livelihood means 
lost. The projected loss to the downstream communities varies from M2.9 million to about M8 
million (Davis & Hirji, 2009: 107). In 1993, the Rural Development Programme (RDP), financed 
evenly between Lesotho and South Africa, was established to deal with mitigating the social 
impacts that the project broadly has had on education and health facilities, as well as communal 
natural resources (Mashinini, 2010: 4). The LHDA also had a health unit to provide health 
facilities to mountain communities and South Africa has inserted social and environment 
programmes in the planning of Phase 2 to further compensate for the impact the LHWP. 
Nonetheless, comparing estimated losses in overall economic assessments reveals that these 
losses are relatively minor in comparison to the major economic benefits generated  overall 
(Davis & Hirji, 2009: 107). 
 
A prime objective of the LHWP for Lesotho is its utilisation as a poverty reduction strategy 
(Haas et  al.,  2010:  13). During the early implementation  of the first  phase of the  LHWP, 
Lesotho’s government made the decision to explicitly use the revenue generated from the project
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towards poverty reduction activities and projects under the Lesotho Highlands Revenue Fund 
(LHRF). A Community Development Support Project (CDSP) was set up, utilising the LHRF as 
a base institution. Strategically targeted towards supporting local communities’ involvement in 
the project, this strategy was vital in reaching the poor, specifically in the rural highlands. 
However, the LHRF had become corrupted, influenced by the vested interests of politicians 
(Independent Evaluation Group, 2010: 2). In the Project Appraisal Document of Phase 1B, the 
World Bank (WB) identified the weaknesses as a result of poor accountability and technical 
review mechanisms (thereby bringing into question the sustainability of investments into local 
community projects), as well as a lack of transparency (Haas et al., 2010: 13). In addition, 
members of Lesotho’s parliament identified the poor guidelines for their constituencies to access 
funds (Haas et al., 2010: 14). The Appraisal Document also identified that the fund needed 
substantial reformation that would require: 
 
‘[…]new guidelines on selecting and approving sub-projects, building capacity 
to provide technical assistance to communities, and institutional restructuring to 
provide        the        skills        and        mechanisms        to        be        effective 
(Independent Evaluation Group, 2010: 3).’ 
 
Subsequently, the LHRF was replaced with the Lesotho Fund for Community Development 
(LFCD), which included annual financial and technical audits, new budgetary procedures, and 
procedures that also allowed these newly developed procedures to be made publicly available 
(Haas et al., 2010: 14). A preferential focus was given to five pre-identified poor districts in the 
highlands, as well as poor peri-urban areas in the core urban area, Maseru (Haas, 2009: 26). A 
World Bank Implementation Completion Report (ICR) identified the governance arrangements 
and the outcomes of the LFDC as ‘highly unsatisfactory’ (Haas, 2009: 26). Major limitations 
towards involving communities in infrastructure development persisted due to the lack of local 
capacity. A lack of transparency and poor benefit-sharing mechanisms remained a pertinent 
issue. The LWHP did make a substantial revenue contribution within the formal budget 
framework, subsequently contributing to poverty alleviation. This points to the fact that, while 
South Africa does play a role, Basotho governors or weak institutional mechanisms have also 
been a hindrance to effectively utilising the resources endowed through the LHWP. There are 
various actors at fault, but criticism is vital to not grossly glorify the benefits of the project.
55 
 
 
While criticisms are important to acknowledge, they do not detract from the gains enjoyed by 
both countries. Matlosa (1998: 29) divides these gains into the quantitative and qualitative 
spectrums. Whereas the quantitative approach counts the general benefits to Lesotho from a 
technocratic perspective, specifically the financial returns, the qualitative approach transcends 
the financial benefits. The quantitative approach assumes that the financial gain trickles down to 
the local communities, but the critiques from the qualitative approach present how particularly 
local  communities  do  not  identify with  these  benefits  due  to  various  issues  addressed,  for 
example displacement or the destruction of sustainable livelihoods. It is important in the context 
of this analysis that Matlosa (1998: 30) argues that these approaches do not have to be mutually 
exclusive and one can acknowledge both positive and negative ramifications of the LHWP. 
 
5.3      Lesotho, conflict and intervention 
 
The trajectory of Lesotho’s political terrain has been characterised by overt and covert internal 
conflicts, manifesting in long-term constitutional disorder and institutional decay. A technical 
count reveals three successful coups have occurred (Dionne, 2014).
13 
There is an uncertainty of 
incumbent ruler’s terms due to the trajectory of attempted and successful coups in both the 
apartheid and post-apartheid eras. This thesis has already elaborated on the 1986 coup that 
ousted Jonathan and how the apartheid government manipulated tensions and facilitated the 
forced installation of the compliant BCP under Mokhehle. The second occurred in 1991 and the 
third in 1994 (Rosenberg & Weisfelder, 2013: xxxi). These ‘struggles for power’ among the 
political elite have hindered the long-term governance and functionality of meaningful 
governance processes in the national assembly (Matlosa, 1999: 163). 
 
Matlosa identifies causal factors that have contributed to Lesotho’s fragile political situation, 
including adopted Westminster British electoral system external dependence factors, addressed 
now. The ‘struggle for power’ is intertwined with the role of a government that is expected to 
deliver  socio-economic  development  in  a  country  where  the  majority  of  the  population 
persistently lives in poverty-stricken circumstances (Matlosa, 1999: 176). The military has also 
 
 
13 
The Washington Post article by the cited author Kim Yi Dionne, titled ‘There wasn’t a coup in Lesotho, but will 
there be?’, referred to a ‘technical count’ of coups (Dionne, 2014). This technical count is part of an ongoing data 
project by Jonathan M. Powell at the University of Central Florida that defines a coup d’état as ‘illegal and overt 
attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive’, whereby successful 
coups are ‘episodes in which the perpetrators control power for at least 7 days’ (Powell, n.d.).
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been mired in controversy as it has been utilised as a tool in partisan games (Matlosa & Pule, 
 
2001: 63). 
 
 
Jonathan’s  early rule sowed  the seeds  of  constitutional  disorder. The manifestations  of the 
unsuitable electoral FPTP electoral system and the series of events once Prime Minister Jonathan 
started to resist the expectations of the  apartheid regime have already been  addressed (see 
Chapter Two), and will not be discussed here. However, it will be mentioned that Jonathan’s 
early rule was evidence of the fact that Lesotho was forced to forge ‘friendly relations’ with 
apartheid South Africa due to bread-and-butter issues. Once an adversary, South Africa was able 
to  strategically  utilise  coercive  measures  to  assert  its  dominance  and  force  Lesotho  into 
compliant behaviour. Prior to South Africa’s formal joining of SADC in 1994 and well before 
apartheid’s end, analysts were curious as to whether South Africa could play the role as a benign 
dominant power in SADC, specifically if apartheid collapsed (Weisfelder, 2014: 116). Although 
their memberships within SADC are beyond the scope of this analysis, Weisfelder (2014: 116) 
points out how ‘well-informed Basotho [are of the persuasion that South Africa’s] regional 
actions in Lesotho’ are merely ‘the dominance of its enveloping neighbour in a new guise’. 
 
While South Africa’s capability to coerce Lesotho into compliance remains, hostilities between 
the two countries subsided after 1986 and improved further along with the international euphoria 
of the end of white-minority rule in South Africa (Meissner, 2015: 36). With apartheid’s demise, 
South Africa concertedly aimed towards reframing its regional identity as a benign power far-off 
from the aggressive tactics of the preceding rulers (Hamill, 1998: 1). To ‘shed the skin’ of its 
predecessors and abandon aggressive tendencies of the apartheid regime, South Africa expressed 
its  adoption  of  new  anti-militaristic  regional  policies  of  ‘non-interference’,  thereby  not 
interfering in the domestic affairs of other nation-states (Nordiska Afrikainstitute, 2001: 59). 
This  early  post-apartheid  period  of  ‘reframing’  South  Africa’s  role  on  a  regional  and 
international scale did not dissolve suspicion or predictions. Nonetheless, expectations were 
commonly positive as an end to the ‘era of hostilities’ sustaining white-minority rule and the end 
of the Cold War all contributed towards an overall friendlier regional political landscape. 
 
Prior to the formal inauguration of the ANC as the leading political party in April 1994, ANC 
 
political officials were decision-makers to the means adopted to quell internal conflict in Lesotho
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(Weisfelder, 2014: 116). Transformations in South Africa’s domestic political environment 
coincided with a series of mutinies that manifested from fraught political instability in Lesotho. 
The leaders of the ANC and NP, Nelson Mandela and the then-President F.W. de Klerk 
respectively, met in January 1994 along with President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and then- 
President Ketumile Masire of Botswana to form a task team. As opposed to a unilateral action, 
South Africa consulted on the response towards a series of mutinies in Lesotho as a task team 
with its neighbours in the region (Weisfelder, 2014: 116). After King Letsie III suspended the 
constitution and dissolved Mokhehle’s democratically elected government, a coercive strategy 
became necessary to restore constitutional order (Nathan, 2012: 82). The task team set a deadline 
for constitutional order to be restored, but the King remained intransigent. Subsequently, Letsie 
was compelled into compliance after Pretoria mounted a mass drop of paratroopers and deployed 
a combat aircraft near Lesotho’s border (Nathan, 2012: 82). 
 
The SADC troika partook in Lesotho’s Defence Force Commission of Enquiry that investigated 
the reasons behind the military indiscipline that saw the Lesotho’s Defence Force (LDF) turn 
against an elected government (Weisfelder, 2014: 116). To address the manipulation of the 
military for partisan quarrels and thereby ‘professionalise’ the army, experts from the USA and 
Britain engaged with  Lesotho’s officer corps. The LDF was also  encouraged to partake in 
regional dialogue with its regional colleagues in the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee. 
In addition, from 1998, Lesotho has been encouraged to partake in triennial regional military 
exercises, resulting in the deployment of numerous peacekeepers to Darfur, Sudan (Weisfelder, 
2014: 119). Maaparankoe Mahao, the LDF brigadier who also participated as head of the SADC 
Planning Unit for the Joint Standby Force, stated that such professional, instructive and inclusive 
military projects have ‘immunised the LDF from future intervention in domestic political 
disputes’ (Weisfelder, 2014: 119). 
 
Then, in 1997, internal disputes within the ruling party, BCP, culminated in a fractious political 
environment on the doorstep of the ‘new South Africa’. The BCP’s faction fighting resulted in 
the split by the conservative strand, led by the then-Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle, and the 
establishment of the LCD (Poku, 2001: 92; Matlosa, 1997: 104). The LCD made up the majority 
of parliament as BCP members crossed floor to the new party, leaving a bitter BCP as the formal 
opposition party (Matlosa, 2006: 23). In addition to the LCD’s popularity, the state resources
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utilised for political mileage facilitated a successful outcome in the 1998 elections. Upon the 
resignation of Mokhehle, Pakalitha Mosisili became the new Prime Minister. As emphasised in 
the historical background, the FPTP electoral system was the bone of contention among 
competing political parties and this contention resurfaced in 1998 as ‘the worst violent conflict in 
Lesotho’s history involving the government and some opposition parties’ (Matlosa, 2008: 26).14 
Despite discrepancies and accusations by opposition parties of chicanery, the election outcome 
 
was deemed ‘free and fair’ by international observers. Lesotho became ungovernable as the BCP 
and BNP joined forces to contest the election through launching strikes, demonstrations and 
confrontations (Weisfelder, 2014: 116). Mutinous LDF members seized arms and ammunition, 
and imprisoned or expelled commanding officers, while government officials were virtually held 
hostage. LDF soldiers allegedly supplied youths with AK47s and assault rifles, resulting in 
havoc in Maseru and other urban areas. Lesotho’s broadcasting station was closed, government- 
owned vehicles were vandalised or hijacked, illegal road blocks were set up and Lesotho’s police 
ultimately lost control (Molomo,1999: 141; Neethling, 1999: 1). 
 
High-ranking mediators from South Africa attempted to diffuse the conflict through diplomatic 
ventures. The then-Deputy President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki; Minister of Defence, Joe 
Modise; Minister of Safety and Security, Sydney Mufamadi, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Alfred Nzo, all failed at alleviating the tensions (Weisfelder, 2014: 117). Mbeki appointed a 
commission  of inquiry into  the alleged  electoral  fraud  (Matlosa & Pule, 2001:  60–1).  The 
SADC-sponsored  Langa  Commission  of  Enquiry  resulted  in  ambiguous  findings  that  only 
further added fuel to the conflict (Motsamai, 2015: 3; Rosenberg & Weisfelder, 2013: 213). 
After Mosisili’s repeated pleas for military intervention and conclusions by South Africa and 
Botswana that the only means to resolve the conflict would be via a military intervention, a 
military intervention was sent into Lesotho under the auspices of SADC (Weisfelder, 2014: 117). 
 
The military mission, codenamed Operation Boleas, saw the South African National Defence 
Force (SANDF) and the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) intervening in September 1998 
(Molomo, 1999: 133). Operation Boleas was the first deviance from South Africa’s aversion 
policy on military interventions. Six hundred soldiers entered Lesotho on 22 September in the 
 
 
 
14 
See Chapter Two: ‘Historical Background’ under ‘Lesotho’s political independence’.
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early morning (Neethling, 1999: 1). Despite the fact that mission was meant to be a combined 
task  force,  the  BDF  only  entered  after  nightfall.  The  operation  was  met  with  unexpected 
resistance from the LDF, resulting in the death of an estimated 58 Basotho and six South African 
soldiers (Nathan, 2012: 82). 
 
In the context of this analysis, it is important to lay out that there is a polarisation in the literature 
relating  to  the  intentions,  legality,  desired  outcomes  and  nature  of  Operation  Boleas.  The 
‘invasion-intervention’ dichotomy within the literature on the topic presents opposing ideas and 
justifications on the process of external military involvement in Lesotho in 1998. Proponents of 
the military involvement as a SADC military intervention emphasise Lesotho’s constant political 
instability and some look upon the intervention as a necessary peacekeeping mission. Other 
political officials justify the legality of the operation due to the fact that: it took place under the 
auspices of SADC, it emanated from a SADC decision not to permit unconstitutional changes of 
government in southern Africa and it formed part of the 1994 Memorandum of Understanding 
with South Africa (Nathan, 2012: 83). The request by Mosisili is deemed legitimate by some 
based on the fact that the King undertakes a ceremonial role, but does not take part in day-to-day 
processes, much like the Queen of England. The King still plays a much more important role 
than the Queen due to his interactions with Basotho (Allison, 2014). Furthermore, the question 
can then be raised of what would have happened if the intervention did not take place. 
 
Proponents  of  the  nature  of  South  Africa’s  military involvement  as  a  military  invasion  of 
 
Lesotho  emphasise  the  operation’s  illegality.  Makoa  identified  Operation  Boleas  as  an 
 
‘invasion’, evident of the ‘apartheid mould’ mirrored by the new South Africa (cited in 
Weisfelder. 2014: 117). Likoti identifies the illegality and illegitimacy of the intervention as it is 
mandatory to consult the King (2007: 253). In addition, the SANDF military presence and the 
notable loss of Basotho lives brought up old wounds of an invasive neighbour (Molomo, 1999: 
144). Hence, it may be understandable as to why South Africa’s military presence may lead to 
some associating the intervention as an infringement upon the vulnerable nation-state’s 
sovereignty. 
 
While recognising the internal factionalism and the concern of a potential civil war, Matlosa 
argues that the operation was not a peacekeeping mission, but merely a military intervention
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(1999:  189). The technical  authenticity of the  operation  as  a peacekeeping mission  is  also 
questionable as Lesotho, Botswana and South Africa did not share a common defence agreement 
(Matlosa, 1999: 189). In addition, the military intervention had no authentic stipulations to be 
justified as a peacekeeping mission from the UN Charter. Regardless of the validity of whether 
the intervention was legally justified or necessary, a pertinent point to make is that Operation 
Boleas demonstrates the military, legal and political complications that can arise in the absence 
of clear and agreed-upon measures, rules and procedures (Nathan, 2012: 85). 
 
A particularly controversial factor was South Africa’s ‘deviance’ from its policy of non- 
interference in other states’ domestic affairs (Prys, 2012: 114; Nathan, 2012: 44–5). Questions 
arose as to why South Africa did not intervene in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) or other countries in southern Africa. Scholars on both sides of the spectrum 
clearly identify the interests of South Africa as its assets located in Lesotho, as well as the 
prevention of a civil war and potential ramifications in a state within South Africa. Lesotho’s 
enclave status means that South Africa is directly impacted by any spillovers of the conflict. 
With regards to the LHWP, South Africa was anxious to secure the Katse Dam. The LDF had 
threatened  to  ‘damage’  the  dam  if  South  Africa  intervened  and  South  Africa  would  not 
jeopardise the multi-billion-rand project. 
 
Scholars commonly analysed the propensity of conflict in situations where sovereign states share 
material or immaterial resources. Interdependence theory, and more specifically complex 
interdependence, is an explanatory model for the absence or irrelevance of conflict or military 
security in  a more closely interconnected  world  where cooperation  is  more beneficial  than 
conflict. Conflict is generally looked upon as an occurrence between states. The predicament of 
South Africa’s interventions in Lesotho does not directly reflect the theoretical notion of conflict 
between two states, fighting over control of water resources. As will be illustrated, there is a 
different set of variables at play. The issue here is that the conflict within Lesotho did not start 
off as a conflict with South Africa, but was an internal conflict that could have potentially 
manifested into a coup or further civil strife. Although the concept of ‘interdependence’ applies, 
especially in the case of the LHWP, in the case of Operation Boleas the theory cannot do 
explanatory justice to the predicament. Thereby, the reality at hand runs counter to the political 
bargaining envisaged by ‘interdependence theory’. The extreme power disparities are of a nature
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where South Africa could exercise its domination and, in return, South Africa would not be 
threatened by Lesotho militarily. The military involvement was an intervening variable as in 
South Africa implementing a ‘Big Brother’ approach and coercing political peace and stability at 
that point in time, but for its own interests. Placing emphasis on South Africa’s prime interest as 
the LHWP thus leads scholars such as Likoti, and Solomon and Mahlakeng to look upon the 
intervention through a realist paradigm (Likoti, 2007: 256; Solomon & Mahlakeng, 2013: 35). 
 
‘Interdependence’ is theoretically and conceptually useful to apply in demonstration of how 
countries cannot or are weary to stop a transfer/s in case of a useful transfer being stopped in 
return (Keohane & Nye, 1977: 8). The asymmetrical relationship is of such a nature that Lesotho 
is obliged to cooperate as Gauteng relies wholly on the water transfers from Lesotho, but in 
return Lesotho’s financial dependence on the LHWP is in itself a factor that obliges its own 
political officials to maintain the project for the financial returns, infrastructural benefits and 
employment opportunities. 
 
South Africa has an apartheid and post-apartheid trajectory of military intervention in Lesotho’s 
domestic tensions. Negotiated settlements failed to quell friction in 1998, but there have been 
arguably more constructive and peaceful means adopted to address Lesotho’s political 
predicaments. An extended troika oversaw the Interim Political Authority (IPA), established to 
facilitate political reconciliation and electoral reform (Rosenberg & Weisfelder, 2013: 419). The 
results of this political engineering introduced necessary changes to Lesotho’s electoral process, 
of which the most significant change was the introduction of the mixed-member proportional 
(MMP) system (Matlosa, 2006: 25). The MMP system, adopted in the 2002 election, allowed for 
broader representation of political parties and ridding of the one-party rule that manifested from 
a  mere  FPTP  electoral  system  (Motsamai,  2015:  3).  Regarded  as  constructive  reform,  the 
outcome of the new election did not result in protracted conflict over its legitimacy. After the 
election, Lesotho engaged in SACU and SADC deliberations ‘without the prior cloud of 
illegitimacy’, partook in the African Peer Review Mechanism and entered into an agreement 
with South Africa on conducting a feasibility study for Phase 2 of the LHWP (Weisfelder, 2014: 
118). However, the economic woes took its toll on Lesotho within an altering configuration of 
southern Africa, a rising Aids epidemic and bitter faction fighting within the LCD set the stage 
for yet another political crisis five years down the line (Weisfelder, 2014: 118).
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In 2007, the LCD manipulated a loophole in electoral law to maintain its majority in the national 
assembly,  depriving  its  splinter  party,  the  All  Basotho  Convention   (ABC),  of  its  18 
proportionally determined seats from the election (Weisfelder, 2014: 118). A nationwide strike 
was called off after SADC agreed to find a resolution, resulting in the SADC Summit of Heads 
of State and Government appointing a troika where cabinet ministers visited Lesotho to assess 
the conflict. This fact-finding mission established that the key causes were: the manipulation of 
the electoral system, party alliances and miscommunication among political leaders. In 2007, the 
Chairman of the Christian Council of Lesotho took over as mediator after Mosisili rejected 
findings of the manipulation of the MMP system (Weisfelder, 2014: 118). With no military or 
coercive diplomatic leverage, this latest SADC intervention was not effective, but facilitated the 
necessary pressure for Basotho leaders to find an urgent resolution (Weisfelder, 2014: 118). 
Then, in 2012, ABC, BNP and LCD formed a coalition, securing Thomas Thabane the position 
as Prime Minister (‘Analysis: Did Lesotho’s…’, 2014). However, the coalition collapsed after 
dissatisfaction with Thabane’s sacking and reappointment of appointments in key state 
institutions, especially in 2014 (Motsamai, 2015: 7). Members of Parliament proposed a motion 
of no-confidence in Thabane and called for Mosisili to once again assume the role as prime 
minister, but Thabane suspended parliament. Particularly controversial was the sacking of LDF 
commander, Tlali Kamoli, who rejected his dismissal and led an invasion of police headquarters 
and stations in Maseru, and carried out operations at the residences of rival political officials, 
including Thabane’s (Motsamai, 2015: 6). Subsequently, Thabane fled to South Africa. 
 
In June 2014, South Africa was the first to point out the concerning threat of a military coup in 
 
Lesotho and cautioned against ‘any unconstitutional change of government’ (Motsamai, 2015: 
 
10). Following on from this, SADC envoys conducted a number of working visits with South 
African President Jacob Zuma and Namibian President Hifikepunye Pohamba to facilitate a 
dialogue between the conflicting coalition partners (‘Analysis: Did Lesotho’s…’, 2014). 
Subsequently, Lesotho’s military indiscipline led to its chairmanship of the SADC Organ on 
Politics, Defence and Security being handed over to South Africa after a unanimous vote within 
SADC  (Motsamai,  2015:  10).  At  a  SADC  troika  emergency  meeting  in  Pretoria  on  01 
September, 2014, Thabane requested a military intervention, but this was rejected with SADC 
 
opting  for  political  dialogue  through  bilateral  means  between  South  Africa  and  Lesotho
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(Motsamai, 2015: 10). SADC mediations were characterised as having a heavy South African 
presence. After SADC failed to ensure the implementation of various agreements from mediation 
and Lesotho’s parliament failed to reconvene, South Africa provided Thabane with protection 
from the South African Police Service (SAPS). 
 
South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa led negotiations after being mandated as the 
SADC facilitator at the Double Troika Summit on 15 September 2014 (Motsamai, 2015: 10). As 
a result of the political gridlock, Ramaphosa brokered an early election that was held in 2015, 
which was  thought to  have resolved the issue (Fabricius, 2016;  Motsamai, 2015: 13). The 
outcome of the snap elections saw a coalition of seven parties and the voting in of Mosisili as 
Prime Minister (Mohloboli, 2015a). However, Ramaphosa soon found himself mediating further 
tensions after the assassination of the former army chief, Maaparankoe Mahao,  which was 
carried out by soldiers led by rival Kamoli (Vollgraaf & Ralengau, 2015). Mahoa’s death was 
argued to be a preventative measure to a potential coup. SADC appointed a commission of 
inquiry that  was  headed  by Botswana  High  Court  judge,  Mpaphi  Phumaphi,  to  investigate 
Mahao’s death (Fabricius, 2016). In January 2016, SADC leaders – including representatives 
from South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland and Zimbabwe – provided Mosisili with a lengthy list 
of demands. Some of the demands included a request to sack Kamoli and to create a stable 
political environment to which exiled politicians could return. The leaders endorsed Phumaphi’s 
report  and  requested  Mosisili  publish  and  implement  the  report’s  recommendations  by  1 
February. Mosisili defied the demands and Lesotho was then threatened with suspension from 
SADC. Thus, Mosisili bowed under pressure of suspension and accepted the report. During the 
interim period up until the next elections, South Africa would maintain a military and police 
presence in Lesotho (Mahlaoli, 2016). 
 
South Africa has played a key role in mediations, albeit under continued suspicion as a self- 
interested manipulator. Even though one can acknowledge the asymmetrical relationship and 
South Africa’s anxiety to secure its infrastructure assets, the military intervention Operation 
Boleas  resulted in unnecessary deaths  and has  been costly to South Africa.  Besides media 
scrutiny, the violence that ensued from Operation Boleas raised suspicion on the continent of an 
ANC-led government mimicking the hegemonic tendencies of the apartheid regime (Likoti,
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2007: 258).
15  
However, Operation Boleas, military reform programmes and continued external 
intervention as peaceful means to resolve tensions have all failed to provide a lasting solution in 
Lesotho. These seemingly endless quarrels led to South Africa’s Minister of the Department of 
International Relations  and  Cooperation  (DIRCO)  expressing that  South  Africa had  lost  its 
patience with Lesotho (Mohlaoli, 2016). Some further stress Lesotho’s weak economic base and 
external economic dependence as part of a perpetuating cycle, leading to scepticism of whether 
the transfers Lesotho is so dependent on can be indicative of ‘gains’. At the same time, Basotho 
political officials and the military also need to step up their game as analyses pointing fingers to 
South Africa have to acknowledge the toll these persistent conflicts take on Lesotho’s 
constitutional governance processes, functionality and much-needed investment. 
 
While Lesotho may have been suspended from SADC, peaceful political bargaining measures 
have been adopted to quell the conflict that were not of the more extreme measures the apartheid 
government utilised (for example: sanctions, withholding SACU revenue and threatening to sack 
mining labourers). Instead of allowing Operation Boleas to completely taint the ‘win-win’ 
situation the LHWP has resulted in, the broader metamorphosis of the bilateral relationship from 
denial strategies (boycotts, blockages and sanctions) during apartheid to co-optation strategies 
more frequented in the post-apartheid era has to be considered. Denial strategies are not 
compatible with the LHWP’s implementation (Chan, 2006: 4). Co-option strategies include 
compensatory  side-payments,  loans,  preferential  treatment  and  other  forms  of  financial 
assistance, both unrelated or related to the LHWP. 
 
On the one hand, Turton (2010: 36) explains that there has not been prolonged military conflict 
on the Orange-Senqu River. However, despite the transnational elements surrounding the dual 
reliance on the LHWP, the realist reaction to ‘complex interdependence’ argues that, regardless 
of the intricate channels and ties bilaterally, regionally and with the broader regional community, 
this still does not take away an underlying factor of self-interest that drives both individuals’ and 
states’ courses of action. While South African state undoubtedly has the self-interest of water 
transfers and the protection of the dams, where critiques have commonly pointed this self- 
 
 
 
15  
Even in the post-apartheid period, countries on the African continent are suspicious of South Africa’s power 
interests on the continent. The benevolent leader it has intentionally framed itself is treated with skepticism by some 
African countries (Schoeman, 2003: 361).
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interest as detrimental to Lesotho, Lesotho would too have the interests of the gains from the 
LHWP. In addition, as has been demonstrated, internal conflicts in Lesotho also incorporate the 
self-interest of individuals that disrupts political and social peace and stability. 
 
An overall assessment is not incorporated in this chapter, but forms part of the conclusion 
chapter.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 
6.1      Overall analysis 
 
A comprehensive and highly descriptive analysis has provided much scope into the various 
channels and interactions between Lesotho and South Africa that have persisted and evolved 
from the colonial era to the post-apartheid period. A nuanced description of three themes aimed 
to provide context of the highly complex bilateral relationship. Ideas were drawn from 
interdependence theory to gauge the level of cooperation and the transfers each country gains 
under formal and informal interactions, cooperative agreements, and diplomatic ventures. 
 
The historical background and reflections in each chapter reveal how, with the political 
independence of Lesotho, the BNP understood that Lesotho’s enclave status, dependence on aid 
from Britain, a weak industrial and infrastructural base, and migrant labour patterns from the late 
1800s meant the friendly cooperation with South Africa needed to be sustained. In the post- 
apartheid period, the ANC was tasked with drastically reviewing and reforming exclusionary and 
unequal national policies and foreign policy objectives that had been crafted over a lengthy 
period. The new government inherited the responsibility of leading a deeply entrenched and 
embedded unequal socio-economic landscape with its ‘dependents’ in southern Africa. With high 
and often unrealistic expectations, the immediate post-apartheid ‘honeymoon’ phase meant that 
South Africa was anticipated to be the ‘provider’, showering Lesotho with public goods. 
However, the post-apartheid trajectory of South Africa’s bilateral relationship with Lesotho has 
resulted in a mixed bag of results. In terms of interdependence, the extreme dependence of 
Lesotho on South Africa was demonstrated through migrant remittances, SACU and the LHWP, 
versus Gauteng province’s total dependence on water piped from another state. The development 
of each theme illustrates how South Africa is able to indirectly or directly, intentionally or 
unintentionally exercise its dominance. The asymmetrical interdependent relationship is evident 
in each theme where South Africa is able to assert its political and economic dominance in 
pursuit of its national interest. However, there is an apparent high level of cooperation intensity 
and low in explicit conflict intensity.
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Firstly, this dissertation explored the theme of migrant labour. Basotho emigration to South 
Africa for employment is a persistent factor. In the case of the decline of remittances after the 
drop in the need for foreign miners, South Africa prioritised unskilled labour opportunities for a 
far larger population than the small enclave state. Amnesty legislation was introduced in 1995 
and 1996 in an attempt  to not completely dissolve all Basotho labourers, but the resultant 
changed trends did result in a significant amount of retrenchment. This reduced remittance flows 
and affected the national budget. South Africa prioritised its national interest to address its 
skilled labour shortage to the detriment of Lesotho with the Immigration Act of 2002, most 
notably in the health sector. Higher wage prospects and a better infrastructural environment have 
attracted Basotho to South Africa. Nonetheless, overall emigration to South Africa from Lesotho 
has increased as remittance flows maintain the survival of households and sustain Lesotho’s 
financial services. More recently, the Lesotho Special Permit aims to regularise Basotho 
immigrants,  allow for Basotho  to  maintain  or start  businesses  in South  Africa,  and  reduce 
exploitation of migrant labourers. Ramifications of the Lesotho Special Permit over a long-term 
period remain to be seen. The transnational feature of labour immigration, social, language and 
cultural ties, and the geographical proximity of areas between the border is evident of the ‘shared 
community’. Part of this shared community incorporates interdependent interactions between the 
Free State and Maseru. 
 
Secondly, this dissertation explored SACU. In the post-apartheid era, SACU is an asymmetrical 
interdependent customs union that predominantly reflects the dependence of the BLNS on South 
Africa. During apartheid, South Africa more explicitly and through various means of SACU 
solely prioritised its revenue gains, industrial development and market expansion. However, once 
the new South Africa inherited this unequally crafted system, typically Lesotho is dependent on 
it to such a level that the removal of it threatens the revenue gains for its national budget and 
balance of payments. South Africa does still grapple with its economic development in a highly 
competitive and self-interested global political economy. However, South Africa does benefit 
from the neoliberal order more than Lesotho, while Lesotho struggles to maintain financial 
relevance and prevent further budgetary deficits. Unlike in SADC, South Africa does however 
provide a significant proportion of revenue to the BLNS, despite being the most significant 
economic  contributor.  In  addition,  2002  reforms  of  the  RSF  incorporated  a  development
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component to further deal with trade diversion. South Africa clearly has the capability and 
bargaining power to take the lead and has the upper hand in SACU. For a ‘small’ economy such 
as Lesotho, its lack of economic clout and South Africa’s superior capacity gives Lesotho little 
decision-making power in SACU or the CMA. The economic integration of Lesotho shows that 
its economic wellbeing is dependent on and sensitive to the economic performance of South 
Africa.  The  currency  peg  and  customs  revenue  show  that  one  cannot  merely  undervalue 
Lesotho’s membership of these regional bodies as the idea of their performance without these 
bodies poses significant financial harm. It is questionable as to whether Lesotho could stand 
afloat independently in the global economy. On the one hand, Lesotho does gain from a stronger 
economy such as South Africa’s and the superior international standing South Africa has to 
negotiate trade deals. On the other hand, its external dependence factors are intertwined in 
further issues, requiring diversification of its economy and innovative means to resolve the 
marginalisation of its economy that struggles with a largely poverty-stricken majority. 
 
Finally, the LHWP is particularly interesting as it revolves around an interdependent scheme of 
water transfers to one country and financial and infrastructural gain to another, but incorporates 
the controversial theme of South Africa pursuing its economic interests through military means. 
The project has been successful through improved relations and under cooperative mechanisms 
that have robustly institutionalised a project of a transnational nature. 
 
Interdependence theory is useful to demonstrate how South Africa’s economic heartland of 
Gauteng depends completely on inter-basin transfers for industrial and consumptive water 
demands  from  its  neighbour.  Lesotho,  a  country  where  reviewing  its  economy  cannot  be 
analysed without looking towards its extreme dependence on South Africa, has a resource that 
cannot be manufactured. Although an asymmetrical relationship, LHWP presents a ‘win-win’ 
situation and presents a ‘jewel in the crown’ of an impressive intricately planned and world-class 
engineering scheme that is shared between two countries. It shows what is possible when states 
partner for development goals. Some of the most significant gains to Lesotho include royalties 
that have a notable positive financial impact, hydroelectricity (which reduces reliance on South 
Africa) and various infrastructural gains. However, while there are such financial gains to 
Lesotho, one cannot ignore the detriment to the rural communities and their livelihoods.
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A critical theme is the series of events surrounding Operation Boleas. South Africa deviated 
from non-interference and was anxious to protect its economic assets in Lesotho. In addition, 
South Africa also tried to prevent further spillovers of Lesotho’s crisis as political instability in 
Lesotho is effectively a crisis within South Africa’s borders. There are factual disparities of 
whether the military intervention was legitimate or not. However, as time has progressed, there 
have been repeated cases in Lesotho of military indiscipline, constitutional crisis, dissatisfaction 
or manipulation of the electoral system, and a fractious political environment. This frequent 
political turmoil is a hindrance to the national development of Lesotho. While causes may be 
pinned to a power struggle intertwined with a struggle to control state resources sourced 
externally, the political culture is damaging and unnecessary as it has, at times, necessitated 
external interference to avoid a situation such as 1998. South Africa  is often criticised for 
exercising its dominance for its own gain, but a more nuanced picture provided in this analysis 
has pointed to various causal factors and a political culture in Lesotho where political instability 
has become a norm. One has to balance criticism, acknowledgment of South Africa’s capability 
to coerce Lesotho, Lesotho’s political culture and its external dependence, in addition to the 
progressions and various conflict resolution means in the political trajectory after Operation 
Boleas. Furthermore, the internal political instability was a causal factor linked to South Africa’s 
anxiety to protect its assets, but Operation Boleas was not a ‘water war’. Therefore, all these 
factors point to how one needs to unpack the various factors and layers that contribute to a highly 
complicated predicament that complex interdependence cannot provide the answers to. 
 
Within limitations, the theoretical paradigm has provided some conceptual tools and ideas to 
identify how this interdependence represents a complex set of interconnections that ties and 
binds interactions of landlocked Lesotho, completely enveloped by South Africa. The theory 
does not deem military security as a completely irrelevant tool of the state, but points to the 
costly impact and the increasingly interdependent world where cooperation and political 
bargaining is more constructive and beneficial than pursuing one’s interests through military 
means. Especially in the context of the apartheid government’s hegemonic tendencies, the new 
South African government entered a phase where it did not want to be equated with an 
archetypical realist actor – typically through the example of the ‘total onslaught’ and ‘total 
strategy’. Operation Boleas was costly to its reputation, especially on the African continent.
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However, scholarly consensus highlights cooperative relations surrounding the LHWP and more 
broadly on the Orange-Senqu River. There has not been prolonged conflict between the riparian 
states, as even within the SADC region, scholars commend a cooperative landscape due to the 
common understanding of the implications of water-stressed areas. 
 
The overall analysis of interdependent relations demonstrates that the extent of Lesotho’s 
dependence hinders its political bargaining power. The issue is that the theory of complex 
interdependence is more appropriate to apply to countries with similar levels of development or 
similar capacities to influence outcomes beyond military means. Lesotho’s sensitivity to South 
Africa  demonstrates  that,  if  South  Africa  makes  a  decision  in  its  interests,  even  if  not 
intentionally directed towards having debilitating affects to Lesotho, such decisions can still 
negatively impact the country (for example, the internalisation policy for labour). However, there 
are other interests, such as the signing of the TDCA or broader considerations of South Africa’s 
economic interests in the neoliberal global political economy that raise eyebrows. Although 
South Africa inherited an equally crafted system such as SACU, South Africa also needs to 
consider the beneficial standing it inherited when countries such as Lesotho tried to maintain 
political sovereignty from the apartheid regime. During that period, unilaterally imposed policies 
such as ISI contributed to its current advantageous economic standing in Southern Africa. 
 
The relationship is asymmetrical when one considers that South Africa is less dependent on 
Lesotho than Lesotho is on South Africa. Yet, there is a break from the past and the relationship 
has evolved in various ways. Lesotho went from a territory expected to be incorporated into 
South Africa, where eventually Jonathan’s dissidence and South Africa’s ‘strangling grip’ 
increased hostilities. This relationship represented a typical case of Lesotho being coercively 
forced into compliance under South Africa’s extreme tactics that were frequently adopted. After 
the ‘cessation of hostilities’ with de Klerk’s rule, but more significantly with the inception of a 
democratic government, the nature of the relationship undoubtedly changed. It went from one of 
low cooperation to high cooperation intensity. This dissertation has considered the bilateral 
relationship in isolation of the apartheid government. There is an ambiguous set of findings, but 
each theme also points to the various areas of cooperation and how the relationship continuously 
evolves and changes more over time when new events occur, as policies are adapted or new ones 
are introduced or factors outside the control of each state affects the bilateral relationship.
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Nonetheless, the reality is that the economic woes of Lesotho have not significantly improved 
since independence. The channels of dependence have largely persisted and, with its economy 
integrated and sensitive into that of a developing country’s economy, negatively impacted by the 
global financial  crisis of 2008,  Lesotho is likely to remain an  LDC as one of the poorest 
countries in the world. While factors such as geopolitical dependence cannot be changed, 
decreasing dependence of Lesotho rests on the backs of both sides as a long-term endeavour.
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Appendix A: Maps of Lesotho 
Figure 2: A map of Lesotho showing the main cities and towns 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2005) 
Figure 3: A map of Lesotho showing the border posts and proximity to Bloemfontein, South Africa 
Source: Google Maps (2017) 
